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6.1  Background and Overview 
There is now substantial experience around the world with partial or com- 
plete  shifts from government pension  systems to private funded plans. Al- 
though  there  are  important  common  features  of  all  such  transitions,  each 
country that makes  such a transition faces a unique problem, reflecting the 
demographic and economic situation of that country and the promises and ex- 
pectations embedded in existing law.' 
In the United States, the actuarial projection that the social security trust 
fund will be depleted by the year 2030 has fostered interest in options to shift 
from the pay-as-you-go system to a funded or privatized system.' The very low 
implicit rate of  return earned on contributions in the existing pay-as-you-go 
system and the adverse effect of the unfunded program on national saving have 
also encouraged consideration of  the possibility of shifting to a partially or 
fully funded system and, in particular, to a system with individual funded ac- 
counts (see, e.g., Feldstein 1996; Kotlikoff 1996). 
This paper shows that shifting to a funded system would permit the existing 
12.4 percent payroll tax to be replaced in the long run by a payroll tax of about 
2 percent because a funded system has so much higher a rate of return than the 
implicit rate of return in a pay-as-you-go unfunded social security program. 
Martin Feldstein is the George F.  Baker Professor of  Economics at  Harvard University and 
president of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Andrew Samwick is assistant professor 
of economics at Dartmouth College and a faculty research fellow of the National Bureau of Eco- 
nomic Research. 
The authors are grateful to the participants in the preconference and conference meetings for 
their comments and suggestions. They have extended the analysis of this paper in several ways in 
Feldstein and Samwick (1997). 
I.  See, e.g.,  World Bank (1994) and the papers in this volume describing the experiences in 
Argentina, Australia, Chile, Great Britain, and Mexico. 
2.  See the alternative proposals in Advisory Council on Social Security (1997). 
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This reduction in the payroll tax results in a reduction in the deadweight loss 
that is itself equal to about 2 percent of payroll. Thus, the long-run gain from 
shifting to a funded system is almost as large as the entire 12 percent payroll 
tax. This is equivalent to a permanent increase in real income of about 5 per- 
cent of GDP. 
A major concern in all discussions of privatizing social security is the transi- 
tion path. Critics of privatization  argue that current and projected  conditions 
in the United States-a  population that is growing slowly and aging rapidly, a 
low rate of economic growth, and a very generous level of promised benefits- 
make the transition  from the existing unfunded system to individual funded 
accounts too costly to be politically acceptable. Current employees now pay a 
12 percent payroll tax to finance the benefits of current retirees. In the transi- 
tion to a funded system, these employees would have to pay this plus the contri- 
butions to fund their own future benefits. Critics argue that this combination 
would be too onerous to be acceptable, and even those who favor a funded 
system in principle may fear that they are correct. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the basic issues involved in a transi- 
tion and to explore alternative feasible transition paths from the existing U.S. 
pay-as-you-go social security system to a program of funded mandatory indi- 
vidual retirement accounts (MIRAs). The transition plans that we study are 
constrained to provide the same level of benefits in each future year as retirees 
would receive from the existing social security system. In addition, the financ- 
ing leaves the projected path of the social security trust fund unchanged, thus 
guaranteeing that any additional private saving that results from the mandatory 
individual retirement accounts is a net addition to the nation’s capital stock. 
An important finding in our analysis is that the additional payments that are 
required in the early years of the transition are small relative to the existing 
payroll tax and to the long-run gains from privatization. These additional pay- 
ments during the early part of the transition can be anywhere from 1 to 3 per- 
cent of payroll. Younger workers at the time of the transition are net benefici- 
aries over their own lifetimes. Although the gains of the older workers are not 
large enough to compensate them for the higher costs in the early years of the 
transition, when we look at nuclear families of parents and their children, we 
see that a substantial majority of two-generation pairs are likely to be net gain- 
ers. More generally, the gains occur quickly enough and are large enough that 
the present value of the annual net changes over the first fifty years are positive 
for any reasonable discount rate. 
A basic problem in analyzing alternatives to the current system is that the 
benefits “promised”  in current law are inconsistent with the current level of 
taxes. The social security actuaries predict that the existing trust fund will be 
exhausted by about the year 2030, a date that has been advanced repeatedly 
during the past decade. We therefore cannot sensibly compare alternative tran- 
sition paths to the tax and benefit schedules in current law but must make some 
assumption about how the system would be kept solvent if it were not privat- 
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system would keep the existing 12.4 percent tax rate for the old age, survivors, 
and disability insurance (OASDI) program but would cut benefits when the 
trust fund is exhausted. We refer to all these feasible benefit paths as the base- 
line benejit paths to distinguish them from the current law benejit path. We 
also simulate a proposal to maintain the benefit rules embodied in current law 
by  raising the tax rate after 2030 to the level required to meet the resulting 
benefit obligations. 
One final introductory comment is needed about our use of the term privat- 
ize. We are analyzing the transition to a system of mandatory individual retire- 
ment accounts, similar to current IRAs and 401(k)s, to which employers and 
or employees would be required to make contributions that would then be in- 
vested in stocks and bonds. There are two aspects of this that should be empha- 
sized. First, participation is not voluntary. Everyone must participate and thus 
provide for his or her retirement.3  Second, while the funds could in principle 
be collected and invested by  the government, we believe that there are many 
reasons for preferring a decentralized system in which individuals andor em- 
ployers choose private fund managers. For this reason, we refer to the proposed 
alternatives as privatizing social security. 
To motivate interest in the problem of transition, this paper begins in section 
6.2 by indicating in more detail the potential steady-state benefit of substituting 
a funded mandatory individual retirement account program for the existing 
U.S. pay-as-you-go social security system. The remaining sections of the paper 
present our simulations and analyses of a variety of  feasible transition paths 
for the U.S. social security system. 
Section 6.3 provides some simple calculations to show the order of magni- 
tude of  the extra taxes required during the transition to a funded system that 
maintains a feasible baseline benefit path. Section 6.4 then describes our social 
security simulation model (SS-SIM) and discusses the parameter values that 
we have used. Section 6.5 presents results for the simulation of a gradual tran- 
sition to a privatized system for all employees. Section 6.6 deals with the distri- 
butional issue of the benefits for lower-income individuals in a privatized sys- 
tem. Section 6.7 discusses the problem that the returns on privately invested 
funds are uncertain and that actuarially fair annuities based on debt and equity 
returns are not available. 
In section 6.8, we analyze an alternative baseline in which the annual infla- 
3.  The individual's decision to shift from the existing pay-as-you-go social security system to 
the system of individual investment accounts could be made voluntary. Since our analysis assumes 
that individuals receive full credit against their payroll tax liability for contributions to the funded 
retirement accounts, the incentive for individuals to shift voluntarily would be extremely strong. 
But, although the choice between the current system and the funded alternative could be  made 
voluntary, individuals are required to participate in one of the two. 
There are two obvious alternatives to a mandatory system: a voluntary system coupled with 
either a means-tested benefit or a uniform flat-rate benefit. A means-tested system runs the risk of 
discouraging savings if the level of benefits is set high enough or of leaving undesirable poverty 
if it is set too low (see Feldstein 1987). A flat-rate benefit may also discourage private saving and 
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tion adjustment to social security benefits would be reduced by  1 percentage 
point. In section 6.9, we turn in the opposite direction and consider a transition 
to a privatized system that maintains the current law bene$t  path. Instead of 
requiring a rise in the payroll tax from 12.4 to more than  19 percent, the fully 
funded system can maintain benefits with a long-run contribution rate of only 
slightly more than 3 percent. We present the corresponding transition path. 
A final section summarizes our findings and comments on some issues that 
remain to be analyzed. 
6.2  The Steady-State  Advantage of a Funded Retirement Program4 
In a growing economy with an unchanging age structure, an unfunded pay- 
as-you-go (PAYGO) social security retirement system that is financed by a con- 
stant payroll tax rate provides each cohort of participants with an implicit real 
rate of return on their tax contributions equal to the aggregate rate of growth 
of the economy (Samuelson 1958). For the current illustrative calculation, we 
take this rate of return to be 2.5 percent, the rate of growth of real wage and 
salary payments between  1960 and  1995 (Economic Report of  the President 
1996).5 
In contrast, funds that are saved and invested in the nation’s capital stock 
earn a real rate of  return  for the nation that is equal to the pretax marginal 
product of capital. For the past thirty-five years, this has averaged slightly more 
than 9.0 percent.6 We now assume that the individual can in principle receive 
the entire 9 percent in a funded account; we defend the reasonableness of this 
assumption below. 
To  see the importance of the difference between the 2.5 and the 9 percent 
rates of return for the required amount of retirement saving, consider the very 
simple example of an individual who saves at one point during the middle of 
his working life for consumption during the middle of  his retirement years. 
More specifically, consider an individual who is age forty-five and who “saves” 
$2,600 (approximately the current average payroll tax payment) to finance re- 
tirement consumption at age seventy-five. With the PAYGO real return of 2.5 
percent, this $2,600 increases over the thirty-year period to $5,454. If the indi- 
vidual had instead earned a real 9 percent return on his retirement saving, this 
4.  The steady-state gain of a funded program must be balanced against the costs of transition. 
Realistic estimates of these costs are the primary focus of this paper. We present calculations that 
show that the present value of the gains exceeds these costs for any reasonable discount rate, even 
when the horizon is limited to forty years. For a theoretical discussion of the conditions under 
which shifting from an unfunded to a funded program has a positive present value, see Feldstein 
(199%). 
5. Because of the reduced rate of growth during the past two decades, Board of Trustees (1995) 
assumes that the rate of growth in the future will be only 2 percent. 
6. Rippe  (1995). following the method described in Feldstein, Dicks-Mireaux, and Poterba 
(1983), found that the real pretax marginal rate of return on capital in the nonfinancial corporate 
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$5,454 retirement amount could have been “purchased” at age forty-five for 
only $411 instead of $2,600. 
If the $2,600 PAYGO contribution is obtained by a 12.4 percent payroll tax, 
this implies that the tax could be reduced to ([411/2600] X  12.4 percent =) 
1.96 percent. 
The individual benefits in two quite distinct ways from being in the high- 
yield funded program rather than the low-yield PAYGO  program. First, the 
individual saves $2,190 in taxes at age forty-five while maintaining the original 
benefits in retirement. Second, the distortionary payroll tax is reduced from 
12.4 to 1.96 percent. Each of these deserves more comment, as does the as- 
sumption that the entire 9 percent pretax return is available to the mandatory 
individual retirement account. 
First, the individual’s gain at age forty-five is not a “future” gain in the form 
of higher benefits (which might be discounted by the individual at a high per- 
sonal discount rate) but a tax reduction available immediately for additional 
consumption. Moreover, valuing this as $2,190 of  additional consumption at 
age forty-five may understate its value to the individual, who may be able to 
obtain a higher level of utility by  saving some of  that additional disposable 
income. 
Second, the existing 12.4 percent payroll tax distorts employment and com- 
pensation decisions. While  1.96 percentage points can be thought of  as the 
amount needed to purchase a retirement benefit, the remaining 10.44 percent- 
age points represent a pure tax. A deadweight loss results from this tax because 
of the compensated change in individual labor supply broadly defined (to in- 
clude not only participation and hours but also choice of job, degree of effort, 
location, etc.) and in the consumption of  such things as fringe benefits and 
better working conditions that are not part of taxable payroll income. The mag- 
nitude of the deadweight loss depends on the combined marginal tax rate that 
results from the income and payroll taxes. Taking the combined federal and 
state marginal income and sales tax rates to be 25 percent implies that the net 
payroll tax of 10.44 percent raises the marginal tax rate from approximately 25 
percent to approximately 35.5 percent. The deadweight loss rises from being 
proportional to the square of 0.25 (i.e., to 0.0625) to being proportional to the 
square of 0.355 (i.e., 0.126, about twice as large). 
Since the deadweight loss reflects changes in both labor supply and the form 
of  compensation, the relevant elasticity is the compensated elasticity of  the 
taxable income with  respect to  the  net-of-tax  share of  income (Feldstein 
1995b). If  we  write that elasticity as E,  the increased deadweight loss due to 
the 10.4 percent net payroll tax can be written (following Harberger 1964; and 
Browning 1987) as OS~(0.126  -  O.O625)(wL)/(l -  0.355), where WL  is the 
taxable payroll, and the division by  1 -  0.355 reflects the fact that the elasticity 
is evaluated empirically at the net-of-tax wage rate (Browning 1987). In the 
current example,  since the  12.4 percent  payroll  tax  produced  revenue  of 
$2,600, the value of WL  is $20,967. The increased deadweight loss is therefore 220  Martin Feldstein and Andrew Samwick 
$1,032~.  Although  estimates  of  E  for changes  in  the  income  tax  for high- 
income  individuals  suggested  values  of  E  between  1.0  and  1.5 (Feldstein 
1995a; Auten and Carroll 1994), we will be conservative and assume E = 0.5. 
With this value, the increased deadweight loss associated with a PAYGO tax 
of  12.4 percent is $516, or 2.5 percent of payroll earnings. 
Note that this point is fundamentally different from the reduced payroll tax 
distortion discussed in Kotlikoff (1996) and in Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). 
Their analyses emphasized the fact that, in the current social security system, 
some individuals receive substantially higher implicit rates of return on their 
contributions than others. They note that, because of these differences and the 
great complexity of  the benefit rules, individuals may disregard the link be- 
tween contributions and benefits completely, treating the entire payroll tax as 
a pure tax for which nothing is received in return. They then assume that shift- 
ing to individualized accounts in which all individuals are treated equally can 
be used to eliminate the deadweight loss that results from the payroll tax distor- 
tions even if the individual accounts remain on a pay-as-you-go  basis. They 
arrive at this conclusion by  assuming that the benefits could be paid in a way 
that eliminates the net tax at the margin even though the average benefit repre- 
sents a very low rate of return on the taxes paid. This is possible in their simula- 
tion model because all individuals have the same income. In effect, Auerbach 
and Kotlikoff require each individual to pay both a proportional payroll tax at 
a relatively low rate and a large lump sum tax. The revenue from the lump sum 
tax is used to subsidize the benefits so that the implied return on the payroll 
tax is equal to a market rate of return, eliminating the distorting effect of the 
payroll tax. As a practical matter, however, a lump sum tax equal to at least 
two-thirds of the average social security payroll tax would not be feasible. Al- 
though some reductions in deadweight loss could no doubt be achieved within 
the pay-as-you-go unfunded system by reducing the anomalies in the links be- 
tween taxes and benefits,’ those gains would be  small in comparison to the 
gains that would be  achieved by  shifting from a pay-as-you-go  system to a 
funded  system. All the  welfare gain from reduced  distortion in our current 
analysis  comes  about  because  individuals  are  investing  in  higher-yielding 
assets. 
In summary, by being in a funded program rather than the PAYGO system, 
our forty-five-year-old individual saves 10.4 percent of payroll in contribution 
and an additional 2.5  percent of  payroll in reduced deadweight loss. For the 
individual, the gain is equivalent to 12.9 percent of payroll. Note that this gain 
is more than the entire initial level of the payroll tax. 
The relative size of the gain depends of course on the age of the individual. 
For someone at age thirty, the gain is substantially larger, while, for someone 
on the  verge of  retirement, it is significantly  smaller. A thirty-year-old  who 
now pays a tax of $2,600 to buy benefits at age seventy-five could buy those 
7. On the extent of these differences in effective tax rates, see Feldstein and Samwick (1992). 221  The Transition Path in Privatizing Social Security 
benefits in a funded program (with a 9 percent return) with a payment of only 
$55.00. A sixty-five-year-old who is buying benefits at age seventy-five can 
reduce his cost only from $2,600 to $1,406. 
To get a very rough sense of the overall aggregate effect, consider a work- 
force of individuals between age thirty and age sixty-five with each year’s co- 
hort 1 percent larger than the cohort born a year earlier. If all individuals earn 
the same average income and save to receive benefits at age seventy-five, a 
PAYGO system with a 12.4 percent tax would provide the same benefit as a 
funded system with a 9 percent rate of  return and a contribution rate of 2.2 
percent. This is surprisingly close to the example of  the forty-five-year-old 
examined above. The combination of the reduced contribution and the reduced 
deadweight loss due to the distorting payroll tax is equivalent to about  12.5 
percent of payroll up to the social security maximum. Since the payroll covered 
by  social security is about 40 percent of GDP (Board of Trustees 1995, 190), 
the gain from having a funded system rather than a PAYGO system is equal to 
about 5 percent of GDP. 
This calculation assumes that it is appropriate to attribute the entire real 
pretax return of  9 percent to the mandatory individual retirement accounts. 
About 40 percent of  the 9 percent pretax return on capital (i.e., an amount 
equal to a 3.6 percent return on the private capital investment) is now collected 
by the government in corporate taxes and property taxes. It would be reason- 
able and fair for this return to be given back to the capital that earned it by 
crediting the mandatory  individual retirement accounts with  a government 
matching contribution that supplements the income earned in the account (just 
as the Treasury now rebates the tax collected on social security benefits to the 
social security trust fund). This “government contribution” would not represent 
a net cost to the government since it would simply be the extra corporate tax 
collected because of the new funded retirement accounts.* 
6.3  The Strategy of Privatization 
The strategy of privatization that we pursue in this study does not deal with 
the normative issue of the proper level of social security benefits. Instead, we 
assume that benefits in each future year will be maintained at the same levels 
that would prevail in the absence of  privatization. We  also assume that, by 
investing the MIRA accounts in the market mixture of  debt and equity and 
receiving rebates of  the tax revenues collected from the corporations on the 
8.  It would clearly be wrong to ignore the approximately 3.6 percent return captured in taxes 
and credit the mandatory retirement accounts with just the net 5.4 percent. It could, however, be 
assumed as a matter of political economy that the government would not credit this 3.6 percent of 
MIRA assets back to the MIRAs but would spend it on current consumption or tax cuts. If so, it 
would be necessary to recalculate the mandatory retirement contributions on the basis of the lower 
return and to consider a way  to treat the corporate tax collections as an offset to the resulting 
higher payroll taxes. We present such a calculation based on a 5.4 percent return on MIRA assets 
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incremental MIRA capital, the MIRA funds can earn the real pretax return of 
9 percent. If these funds are used to purchase annuities (so that there are no 
bequests to children from MIRA accounts), the full 9 percent can be used to 
fund retirement and survivor benefits9 
As noted above, the future benefits in our baseline case are not at the level 
implied by the formula in current law since that is not feasible without substan- 
tially raising the existing 12.4 percent payroll tax rate. The social security actu- 
aries now project that, under current law, the real value of the trust fund begins 
declining in 2015 and reaches zero in 2030. Our simulations essentially repro- 
duce this projection. To assume a feasible baseline benefit path, we assume that 
benefits in each year after 2030 are adjusted to the level that can be financed in 
that year with a 12.4 percent payroll tax. Thus, the trust fund is zero in each 
year after 2030.’O 
After the privatization begins, individuals (or their employers or both) are 
required  to  contribute  to  a  mandatory  individual  retirement  account.  The 
amount that is contributed for each individual depends on that individual’s age 
and is calculated to be such that, when the privatization process is fully phased 
in,” the contribution would grow at 9 percent to equal the same benefit stream 
in retirement that the individual would have obtained under the existing un- 
funded system (as modified to maintain solvency) by contributing 12.4 percent 
of his or her covered earnings.i2  Each individual’s MIRA contribution is cred- 
ited against that individual’s payroll tax obligation. A temporary uniform pay- 
roll tax surcharge must therefore be levied on all employees and employers to 
maintain the social security trust fund on its currently projected path.I3 
In the first year of privatization, individuals and their employers in the aggre- 
gate thus pay an amount equal to the full 12.4 percent social security payroll 
tax plus a surcharge that in the aggregate has the value of the specified MIRA 
contributions. 
It is tempting to say that the MIRA surcharge is unnecessary since the credit 
given for the MIRA contributions could instead be offset by reducing the ex- 
9. We are not explicit in the current analysis about survivors or the treatment of spouses. Simi- 
larly, the 12.4 percent tax rate includes social security disability benefits, and these are implicitly 
incorporated in our system. 
10. Section 6.9 presents an alternative analysis in which taxes are raised after 2029 to maintain 
the level of benefits implied by current law. 
1 1.  We discuss a phase-in method of gradually shifting from the current system to the MIRA 
system in sec. 6.5. 
12. If all individuals make MIRA contributions in this way, the transition is similar in spirit to 
the system of recognition bonds used for social security privatization by Chile and other countries. 
It differs in defining the value of the individual’s claim to be based on the benefits to which he or 
she is entitled rather than the taxes that he or she paid. The current strategy also has the feature 
that the existing payroll tax is used to pay principal and interest on the implicit “recognition bonds” 
and that those “bonds” are completely paid off at the death of  the youngest covered worker at the 
time of privatization. 
13. There are of course many alternative transition paths with different distributional conse- 
quences for employees of different ages. For example,  if MIRA contributions are not credited 
against payroll tax obligations, the transition is much more favorable to younger employees and 
less favorable to those nearer to retirement. In principle, payroll tax rates could vary by age. 223  The Transition Path in Privatizing Social Security 
isting social security trust fund. But reducing the trust fund in this way would 
defeat the purpose of the MIRA contributions. The reduction in the trust fund 
would exactly offset the increase in capital formation in the MIRAs that pro- 
vides the higher return than the current unfunded system. 
To assure that the nation’s aggregate capital stock increases by the amount 
of the MIRA contributions, we assume that the payroll tax plus the surcharge 
is set in each year to maintain the trust fund at the level that would have pre- 
vailed in the absence of privatization. (This is not necessary, but any decision 
to reduce the trust fund must be reflected in a lower capital stock and a reduc- 
tion in national income calculated as the product of the reduced capital stock 
and the marginal product of capital, not the government bond rate.) 
The pure pay-as-you-go payroll tax that is required to keep the current trust 
fund path unchanged declines gradually as more and more of the retirement 
benefits come to be funded out of the MIRAs. Eventually, the traditional pay- 
roll tax is unnecessary, and the only contribution that individuals are required 
to make is to the mandatory individual retirement account.14 
Under the current law, social security benefits are based only on the taxes 
that individuals pay when they are thirty years old or older (technically, on 
the thirty-five years of highest income). If full privatization began now for all 
employees between the ages of thirty and sixty-five (we assume that everyone 
retires at age sixty-five),15  when the current thirty-year-olds retire, they would 
not receive any PAYGO benefits but would receive benefits wholly on the basis 
of their MIRA contributions. Those who are now over the age of thirty would 
continue to have some vestige of PAYGO benefits as long as they live. The 
payroll tax could therefore continue for as long as seventy years, but at a very 
much reduced rate. At some point in the future, long before seventy years from 
now, the reduction in the PAYGO benefits to retirees would exceed the MIRA 
contributions. At that point and ever after that, the combination of the payroll 
tax and the MIRA contribution would be less than the 12.4  percent payroll tax. 
The specific timing of this crossover from mandatory contributions (the pay- 
roll tax plus the MIRA contributions)  that are greater than  12.4 percent to 
mandatory contributions that are lower than 12.4  percent will depend on such 
things as (1) whether participation is initially universal or phased in over time 
and (2) whether the MIRA contributions are immediately set to substitute com- 
pletely for the 12.4 percent funding of future benefits or for just a fraction of 
those benefits. We focus on the case in which everyone over age twenty-nine 
is covered immediately but in which the MIRA contributions begin at a level 
equal to just one-fourth of the full amount required to fund future benefits and 
rise gradually until they reach the full amount after twenty-five years. 
Before turning to our detailed analysis of the transition options for the U.S. 
14. At some point, when the traditional payroll tax  is small enough, the system of crediting 
MIRA contributions would be eliminated. By then, all individuals would be paying a combined 
MIRA contribution plus payroll tax that is substantially less than the current 12.4  percent. 
15. To  the extent that  those  who  retire before  (after) age sixty-five have an  actuarially fair 
reduction (increase) in their benefits, the age of retirement does not matter for our calculations. 224  Martin Feldstein and Andrew Samwick 
economy, it may be helpful to consider briefly the way that our basic transition 
would operate in a simple stylized economy. For this purpose, we assume that 
the economy experiences steady-state growth at 2.5 percent and currently has 
an unfunded social security program in which benefits rise at 2.5 percent a year 
at a level that is compatible with a constant  12.4 percent payroll tax rate. We 
assume also that additions to the capital stock earn a real return of 9 percent. 
(The key difference from the actual situation in the United States is that the 
U.S. combination of benefit promises, changing demography, and initial trust 
fund is not consistent with a 2.5 percent implicit return and is not financially 
viable.) 
The required MIRA contributions in this steady-state economy have already 
been derived in section 6.2 above. We saw there that a forty-five-year-old who 
earned 9 percent instead of 2.5 percent could replace a 12.4 percent tax with a 
1.96 percent  MIRA contribution.  More generally, we saw that, if  the labor 
force is growing at 1 percent a year, the real wage rate is rising at 1.5 percent 
a year and, if all workers earn the same wage, the  12.4 percent tax could be 
replaced by a 2.2 percent MIRA contribution. 
The 2.2 percent is therefore an estimate of the level of MIRA contributions 
that would be possible in steady state after the last PAYGO retiree had died. It 
is also a rough estimate of the payment that workers (andor their employers) 
would have to make in the first year of the transition (before there is any benefit 
replacement) in addition to the 12.4 percent PAYGO tax if there is an immedi- 
ate shift to full MIRA contributions.16 Thus, the tax rises in the first year to 
14.6 percent. In the second year, however, the new retirees receive some of 
their retirement income from the MIRA saving that they did in the previous 
year and therefore receive less in PAYGO benefits. Thus, 14.6 percent would 
be the maximum tax during the privatization period and would fall rapidly over 
the transition period as the amount of  the future PAYGO  retiree benefits  is 
replaced by MIRA benefits. 
Rather than explore the time path for this hypothetical economy, we return 
to the simulation analysis of the actual U.S. economy and its current and future 
demographic structure. 
6.4  The SS-SIM Model 
This section describes the micro simulation model that we use to analyze 
alternative privatization paths. The model has four basic components: (1) dem- 
ographic projections; (2) basic economic assumptions; (3) social security rules; 
and (4) the response of taxpayers to changes in tax rates and the associated 
changes in deadweight losses. The model is calibrated so that, with the current 
social security rules, it reproduces the basic time series of benefits, revenues, 
and trust fund assets predicted in Board of Trustees (1995). 
16. With a 25 percent phase-in in the first year, the corresponding incremental payment would 
be one-fourth of the 2.2 percent, or 0.55 percent. 225  The Transition Path in Privatizing Social Security 
6.4.1  Demographics 
The unit of analysis in the simulation is the individual. We  simplify the so- 
cial security rules by  making no specific adjustments for married couples or 
survivor benefits. The values of these benefits as well as of the disability bene- 
fits are all subsumed in the projected individual retirement benefits. 
Our analysis incorporates the actual current age structure of the population 
and the Census Bureau projections of  future births through  2050 and the 
cohort-specific life tables for individuals born through 2050.’’ To  reflect the 
net inflow of  immigrants, we  scale up the projected population uniformly at 
every age to coincide with the aggregate projections of  the Social Security 
Administration. 
6.4.2  Economic Assumptions 
The simulations assume that individuals enter the labor force at age twenty- 
one and work until age sixty-five (or death if  that occurs sooner). Since not 
everyone in the population actually works during these years, and since there 
are workers in covered employment at younger and older ages, we  select a 
labor force participation rate among twenty-one- to sixty-four-year-olds that 
gives the correct number of covered workers in 1995 (Board of Trustees 1995, 
122). This is a 94 percent participation rate among individuals aged twenty- 
one through sixty-four. The number of workers in future years is also calibrated 
to the social security projections, implying small fluctuations in future labor 
force participation rates. 
The assumed wage in  1995 is the average earnings in covered employment 
($24,825). This reflects the ceiling on taxable wages ($61,200 in  1995) but 
overstates the taxable payroll because some employees with multiple jobs ex- 
ceed the maximum taxable wage. Taxable payroll per employee has averaged 
about 83.5 percent of the average wage in covered employment, a ratio that we 
assume holds in the future as well. 
We use the historic data for average earnings in covered employment in pre- 
vious  years  and  follow  the intermediate assumption in  Board  of  Trustees 
(1995) that, after 1995, the average real wage rises at 1.0 percent per year. The 
movements in the average real wage are assumed to reflect changes in the age 
structure of the labor force and differences among age groups in the rate of 
increase of  wages. More specifically, on the basis of  the pattern of  covered 
earnings by  age as reported in Social Security Administration (1999, we  as- 
sume that annual earnings rise at g + 3 percent for individuals under age thirty- 
five, at g + 1 percent for individuals between thirty-five and forty-five, and at 
g -  1.5 percent for those above forty-five years old, where the value of g for 
each year is chosen to make the overall rise in wages equal to the historic 
record before 1995 and to the projected 1 percent rise after 1995. 
17. Our source for the initial population numbers is Bureau of  the Census (1996b). The census 
source of  both births and mortality projections is Bureau of the Census (1996a). 226  Martin Feldstein and Andrew Samwick 
The social security trustees assume that the assets in the trust fund will earn 
a 2.3 percent real interest rate in the future. Since the basic policies that we 
study leave the path of benefits and taxes (and therefore of the trust fund) un- 
changed, this rate of interest is not relevant for the analysis of these options. 
The real marginal product of  capital is assumed to be 9 percent. As noted 
above, the average pretax rate of return on capital in the nonfinancial corporate 
sector from 1960 through 1994  has been slightly above 9 percent (Rippe 1995). 
This  figure  is  derived,  following  Feldstein,  Dicks-Mireaux,  and  Poterba 
(1983), by adding corporate profits, net interest payments, and all taxes paid to 
measure the pretax product of capital and then dividing that by the estimate of 
the capital stock at replacement cost.18 Our estimate makes no allowance for 
the lower return that is earned on capital outside the corporate sector or on the 
net effect of increased capital accumulation on the marginal product of capital 
and on the net international capital flow. 
6.4.3  Social Security Rules 
Each individual is subject to an initial social security payroll  tax of  12.4 
percent. Since average real wages are projected to rise at 1  .O percent a year, we 
increase taxable wages at that same rate. 
Because we use the individual as the unit of analysis, we do not have sepa- 
rate survivors’ benefits. The “return”  on contributions to social security (and 
to the MIRAs) is calculated as if it is all paid in the form of annuities to the 
retired individuals. We also do not make separate provision for disability bene- 
fits. We include the disability tax by using the 12.4 percent tax rate but include 
the disability benefits with the retirement annuity. 
Individuals become eligible for benefits at age sixty-five in the simulation and 
receive benefits until they die. In actual practice, some individuals retire earlier 
than sixty-five, and some wait until later to retire. To the extent that social secu- 
rity benefits are adjusted for the retirement age in an actuarially fair way, these 
differences in retirement age do not change the costs of providing benefits. 
Because we do not distinguish income levels or family structures, we cannot 
apply the actual social security benefit rules. We therefore calculate benefits 
by  attributing a rate of return  on the taxes that each individual has paid. We 
follow current social security rules and assume that only those taxes paid be- 
tween age thirty and age sixty-five-the  highest thirty-five years of earnings- 
are used in calculating benefits. The cohort-specific real rates of return that we 
use are modifications of earlier estimates by  Boskin et al. (1987); their esti- 
mates, which were for single-earner couples, have been  adjusted to produce 
aggregate benefit amounts that coincide with the trustees’ projections of the 
benefits implied by the current law for future years: 7.0 percent for those born 
before 1915,4.21 percent for those born in 1915, 2.52 percent for those born 
in  1930, 1.67 percent for those born in  1945, 1.39 percent for those born in 
18. These figures relate profits and interest earned in  the United States to  the value of  the 
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1960, 1.39 percent for those born in  1975, and 1.43 percent for those born in 
1990 or after. 
Even  with  the lower rates of  return  for younger  workers  implied by  this 
procedure, the projected benefits cannot be financed by the existing 12.4 per- 
cent OASDI tax rate because of the changing age structure of the population. 
The changing demographics cause the trust fund to be exhausted in the year 
2030. Our basic simulations assume that, at that point, benefits under the ex- 
isting system would be reduced to the level that can be financed on a current 
basis by the taxes collected with a 12.4 percent payroll tax. The calculations 
presented in the next section show that this requires a benefit reduction that 
begins at  18 percent and rises to 35 percent. Two alternatives are also exam- 
ined: the analysis in section 6.8 modifies the existing inflation indexing rule, 
and the analysis of section 6.9 maintains the current law benefits by increasing 
the tax or MIRA contributions. 
6.4.4  Taxpayers’ Responses, Tax Rates, and Deadweight Losses 
The projections of taxable earnings described in section 6.4.2 must be modi- 
fied to incorporate the changes in taxpayer behavior that would result  from 
changes in the payroll tax rates. This is important to estimate both the required 
payroll tax rates and the associated changes in deadweight losses. Traditional 
estimates of the effects of tax rates on labor supply indicate that participation 
rates and average hours are quite insensitive to net-of-tax wages among prime- 
age males and single women but much more sensitive among married women. 
However, this is too narrow a measure of taxpayers’ responses for the current 
purpose. The change in revenue and therefore the required revenue neutral 
change  in  tax  rates  reflects  not  only changes  in  working  hours  but  also  a 
broader definition of labor supply (one that includes choice of job, degree of 
effort, location, etc.) as well as any shift between cash compensation and fringe 
benefits, improved working conditions, and other things that are not subject to 
the payroll tax. Feldstein (1995b) showed that the deadweight loss associated 
with the tax rate depends on the compensated elasticity of taxable income with 
respect to the net-of-tax share. 
There is, unfortunately, no good evidence on this elasticity for changes in 
the payroll tax rate. The estimated elasticities of between 1.0 and  1.5 for the 
income tax (Feldstein 1995a; Auten and Carroll, 1994) are not directly relevant 
because they include changes in deductibles and are for higher-income individ- 
uals. In what follows, we assume that the uncompensated  elasticity  of  labor 
earnings with respect to the relevant net-of-tax rate is only 0.5. Although the 
compensated  elasticity would be larger, we also use an elasticity of  0.5 for 
the deadweight loss calculations. The calculation of the earnings response and 
the associated  adjustment in the tax rate, as well as the implications for the 
deadweight losses, are developed in section 6.5.3. 
Our analysis does not take into account the broader general equilibrium ef- 
fects of the shift to a funded system. The primary general equilibrium effect is 
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real wages. Although the higher real wages reinforce the effect of lower tax 
rates to increase labor supply, the effect is smaller than the tax effect because 
the higher marginal product of labor does not affect the choice between taxable 
wages and other forms of compensation.I9 
6.5  Simulation Results for Gradual Privatization 
This section begins by presenting the values of key variables under current 
law and then shows the “solvency adjustment” to benefits needed to avoid a 
tax increase when the trust fund is exhausted. It then goes on to consider the 
effect of a gradual privatization on tax rates and on the deadweight loss of the 
tax system. 
6.5.1  Current Law and Baseline Simulations 
Table 6.1 shows the projected  values of  the  numbers of covered workers 
and of  beneficiaries  in each year from  1995 through 2071. (The number of 
beneficiaries  is the number of  persons who are supported by social security. 
For a married couple, this is two persons regardless of whether each would 
claim benefits as a retired worker or one would claim as a dependent spouse.) 
The ratio of covered workers per beneficiary declines from the current value 
of  3.27 to 2.03 in the year 2031 and then continues to decline to 1.80 at the 
end of the period. 
Table 6.2 shows our simulation of the projected values of payroll tax receipts 
and of  retirement benefits  under current law. The payroll  tax revenue is the 
result of a constant 12.4 percent rate applied to the projected labor force with 
real wages per employee growing at 1  .O percent per year. The initial payroll tax 
per worker is $2,570. All dollar amounts are reported in constant 1995 dollars. 
The retirement benefits reflect the projected numbers of retirees and the as- 
sumption that benefits are calculated by giving a return to each cohort as de- 
scribed above. 
Table 6.3 shows how the trust fund evolves under current law. The fund is 
increased by the payroll taxes received, receipts from the Treasury, and interest 
on the fund balance, and it is reduced by the benefits paid and administrative 
expenses.2o  In addition, the trust fund is assumed to spend 0.8 percent of bene- 
fits on administrative costs.21 
19.  For examples of the general equilibrium analysis of the effects of  social security reforms, 
see Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) and Kotlikoff (1996, chap. 7 in this volume). 
20.  Under current law, the Treasury adds to the social security trust fund the income tax that it 
collects on benefits. This starts with a very small amount ($5.13 billion in 1995) but grows rapidly 
because the income tax is applied to 85 percent of benefits above an unindexed amount of $32,000 
per couple and $25,000 per single individual. The calculations of the cohort-specific rates of return 
are based on benefits net of the income tax so that this is already taken into account. 
21. The administrative cost of  the funded program is assumed to come from the difference 
between the assumed 9 percent rate of return and the total return of 9.30 percent that Rippe (1995) 
actually reported. 229  The Transition Path in Privatizing Social Security 


































A. Covered Workers (millions) 
141.21  142.49  143.77  145.04  146.32  147.60  148.77 
149.95  151.12  152.29  153.47  154.47  155.47  156.48 
157.48  158.49  159.06  159.63  160.20  160.78  161.35 
161.60  161.84  162.09  162.34  162.59  162.79  162.99 
163.19  163.39  163.59  163.87  164.15  164.43  164.71 
164.99  165.38  165.77  166.16  166.55  166.94  167.32 
167.70  168.09  168.47  168.85  169.11  169.38  169.65 
169.91  170.18  170.37  170.55  170.74  170.92  171.11 
171.25  171.39  171.53  171.67  171.81  171.95  172.09 
172.23  172.37  172.52  172.67  172.83  172.98  173.14 
173.30  173.44  173.58  173.72  173.87  174.01  174.15 


































45.15  45.79 
49.83  50.73 
56.88  58.14 
66.64  68.14 
76.49  77.58 
82.80  83.44 
85.25  85.48 
87.01  87.32 
89.86  90.34 
93.13  93.52 





















94.3  1 
96.76 
3.27  3.25  3.23 
3.14  3.12  3.10 
2.95  2.92  2.86 
2.60  2.54  2.49 
2.25  2.21  2.17 
2.04  2.03  2.02 
1.98  1.98  1.98 
I .97  1.97  1.97 
1.94  1.93  1.92 
I .88  1.87  1.86 
1.83  1.82  1.82 
3.21  3.20  3.18 
3.08  3.04  3.01 
2.81  2.76  2.71 
2.44  2.39  2.34 
2. I4  2.12  2.09 
2.01  2.00  1.99 
1.98  1.98  1.98 
1.96  1.96  1.95 
1.91  1.90  1.89 
1.85  1.85  I .84 
1.81  1.81  1.80 












The simulations show that the net additions to the trust fund continue to be 
positive until 2012 and then turn negative. Even after net additions to the trust 
fund  (from  taxes  and Treasury  transfers  minus  benefits  and  administrative 
costs) become negative, the trust fund continues to grow because of the interest 
earned on the government bonds in which the funds are invested and the Trea- 
sury tax collections on benefits that are transferred to the trust fund. At its peak 













































A. Payroll Taxes ($billions) 
362.96  369.91  376.96  384.12  391.38  398.75  405.93 
413.23  420.63  428.13  435.75  442.98  450.32  457.76 
465.30  472.95  479.40  485.94  492.56  499.26  506.05 
511.90  517.81  523.79  529.84  535.95  541.98  548.07 
554.23  560.47  566.76  573.41  580. I3  586.93  593.81 
600.76  608.21  615.74  623.37  63  1.08  638.89  646.75 
654.70  662.75  670.89  679. I3  687.01  694.97  703.03 
711.17  719.41  727.40  735.48  743.64  75 1.90  760.24 
768.47  776.79  785.19  793.69  802.27  810.97  819.75 
828.63  837.61  846.68  855.92  865.26  874.70  884.25 
893.90  903.58  913.37  923.26  933.26  943.37  953.59 





































































































338.02  344.77  35 1.65 
390.56  398.92  409.38 
466.87  482.00  497.25 
582.85  601.17  619.56 
708.69  723.30  738.02 
804.99  816.10  827.44 
870.04  878.36  887.20 
942.67  956.75  97 1.47 
1,061.14  1,082.29  1,104.54 
1,222.39  1,245.46  1,268.22 
1,376.50  1,396.95  1,417.22 


































7.56  7.60  7.64 
7.89  7.95  8.01 
8.33  8.39  8.47 
8.87  8.95  9.02 
9.34  9.40  9.46 
9.74  9.80  9.86 
10.17  10.23  10.30 
10.76  10.87  11.00 
11.71  11.87  12.04 
12.99  13.18  13.37 
14.26  14.43  14.59 
7.68  7.73 
8.07  8.13 
8.55  8.63 
9.09  9.16 
9.51  9.57 
9.92  9.98 
10.38  10.46 
11.13  11.26 
12.23  12.4  1 
13.56  13.74 











15.06 Table 6.3  Current Law: Trust Fund 
















-  124.33 
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-  147.60 
-  195.69 
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-  17.44 
-100.71 
-172.01 
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-  1,455.54 
-3,269.97 
-  5,608.09 
-8,908.49 






-  144.79 
-  1,695.29 
-3,562.58 
-6,009.5  1 
-9,483.30 







-  1,940.39 
-3,867.33 
-6,432.17 











-  10,7 18.41 








-4.5  17.06 
-7,346.64 
-  11,378.03 







-2,7  14.08 
-4,863.65 
-7,841.05 
-  12,066.03 










-  12,782.68 
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decline in the trust fund after that date causes the fund to be exhausted in the 
year 2030, a date that also coincides with the social security actuaries’ pro- 
jection. 
Since a negative trust fund is not feasible, for the rest of our calculations in 
this section we assume that the current system shifts to a pay-as-you-go basis 
after 2030, with benefits reduced to keep outlays equal to the funds raised by 
a combination of the 12.4 percent payroll tax and the Treasury tax collections 
on existing benefits, all net of the small administrative charge. Table 6.4 shows 
the percentage by which benefits must be reduced beginning in 203 1. The re- 
duction goes from about 18 percent in that year to 24 percent in the next and 
then rises steadily. These simulation results provide the basis for the alternative 
privatization paths that we now consider. 
6.5.2  Phase-In from Partial to Total Privatization 
Table 6.5 shows the effect of starting with a partial privatization for everyone 
and then expanding the privatized share until it completely substitutes for the 
unfunded program. More specifically, in the first year individuals are required 
to contribute to the MIRA an  amount that at a 9 percent rate of  return will 
accumulate enough by  age sixty-five to replace one-fourth of the correspond- 


















































































































































































946.02 Table 6.5  Phase-In from Partial to Total Privatization 


























































































































































.95  1.04  1.13  1.23 
1.61  1.71  1.81  1.90 
2.27  2.35  2.43  2.50 
2.76  2.81  2.76  2.73 
2.55  2.5 1  2.47  2.44 
2.36  2.35  2.33  2.3 1 
2.27  2.26  2.25  2.24 
2.19  2.18  2.17  2.15 
2.11  2.10  2.09  2.07 
2.04  2.04  2.04  2.04 
2.04  2.04  2.04  2.04 























































































12.40  12.39  12.37  12.36  12.33 
12.22  12.16  12.10  12.02  11.93 
11.58  11.43  11.24  11.03  10.82 
10.04  9.73  9.41  9.06  8.69 
7.52  7.09  6.68  6.27  5.85 
6.02  6.23  5.96  5.70  5.42 
4.64  4.39  4.13  3.88  3.63 
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Table 6.5  (continued) 
D. Payroll Tax Needed to Maintain Trust Fund Trajectory (% of  Payroll) 
205 1  1.58  1.41  1.25  1.10  .96  .83  .72 
2058  .62  .53  .46  .39  .33  .28  .24 
2065  .20  .I7  .14  .I1  .09  .08  .06 
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13.32  13.40  13.46  13.53 
13.71  13.73  13.74  13.72 
13.51  13.38  13.25  13.09 
12.17  11.87  11.45  11.05 
9.23  8.78  8.32  7.87 
8.33  8.05  7.75  7.45 
6.40  6.14  5.88  5.62 
4.60  4.36  4.14  3.93 
3.21  3.06  2.92  2.19 
2.43  2.37  2.32  2.27 
2.15  2.13  2.12  2.11 
ing unfunded social security benefits. In the second year, the share of retire- 
ment benefits that is to be prefunded (by that year’s contributions) rises from 
25 to 28 percent. The privatized share increases in this way by  3 percentage 
points a year for twenty-five years until MIRA contributions are enough to 
prefund  100 percent of the benefits associated with that year’s contributions. 
(These figures ignore the effect of changes in tax rates on pretax earnings, a 
restriction that we correct in sec. 6.5.3.) 
The contribution to the mandatory individual retirement account is $20.3 
billion in  1995. This implies that the MIRA contributions are equivalent to 
0.69 percent of taxable payroll, an amount shown in panel B of table 6.5. This 
measures the extent to which the existing generation of employees is required 
in the first year of the transition to pay for their own retirement as well as for 
the existing retiree benefits. It is clearly very much less than having to pay 
twice the existing payroll tax (i.e., an additional 12.4 percent), as some critics 
of privatization imply will happen. 
Since there are no MIRA benefits paid in 1995, panel C of table 6.5 shows 
no benefits replaced  owing to privatization for 1995. The basic payroll tax 
needed to meet the existing benefit requirements and to keep the trust fund on 
its original trajectory therefore remains  12.40 percent of payroll, the amount 
shown for 1995 in panel D of the table. 
Combining the 0.69 percent of payroll MIRA contribution with the 12.4 per- 
cent payroll tax needed to maintain the trust fund trajectory implies total contri- 
butions of 13.09 percent of payroll, the amount shown in panel E of the table.22 
22.  It would of  course be possible to keep the combined MIRA contributions and payroll tax 
unchanged while meeting existing benefit obligations by  reducing the trust fund or by  explicit 235  The Transition Path in Privatizing Social Security 
As  the  privatization  program  moves  forward  through  time,  two  major 
changes occur. First, the amount of MIRA contributions rises (1) as the priva- 
tization share rises from 25 to  100 percent over a twenty-five-year phase-in 
period and (2) as the labor force grows and wages increase. This increase in 
MIRA contributions is shown in panel A of table 6.5. The changing age struc- 
ture of the workforce and the changes in relative benefit levels projected for 
the future also cause the mandatory individual contributions as a percentage 
of payroll to vary in a moderate way; panel B of table 6.5 shows that the contri- 
bution per dollar of payroll reaches a high of 2.81 percent of payroll in 2011 
and then declines to a long-run level of 2.04 percent. 
The second major change is the gradual replacement of the unfunded social 
security benefits with the MIRA benefits. In 1996, those who were sixty-four 
years old in 1995 retire and receive some benefits on the basis of their MIRA 
contributions  in the previous  year. These benefits are just $0.13 billion  (as 
shown in panel C of  table 6.5). By the year 2000, these benefits are $1.35 
billion; this reduces the pay-as-you-go tax rate required to maintain the trust 
fund trajectory from 12.40 to 12.36 percent. 
Over time, this benefit replacement becomes much more important. After 
twenty years (in 2014), MIRA benefits reach $63.07 billion and therefore per- 
mit the payroll tax needed to maintain the trust fund trajectory to decline from 
the initial 12.40 percent to  10.82 percent, as shown in panel D of  table 6.5. 
Seven years later, in 2021, the required pay-as-you-go tax is down to 8.69 
percent. 
Those individuals who are thirty years old or younger in 2020 (when the 
MIRA system is fully phased in) eventually finance their retirement solely with 
MIRA withdrawals. Unlike earlier cohorts, they receive no PAYGO benefits. 
Since we assume that no one lives beyond age one hundred, this means that the 
PAYGO system is completely finished by the seventieth year after privatization 
begins (i.e., in 2090). The results in panel D of table 6.5 show that, as a practi- 
cal matter, the required pay-as-you-go payroll tax is essentially zero (i.e., less 
than 0.5 percent) in 2059 and beyond. 
Combining the MIRA contribution (panel B) and the required payroll tax 
(panel D) produces the combined payroll tax and MIRA contribution shown in 
panel E of table 6.5. This combination remains higher than the existing 12.4 
percent payroll tax for twenty-four years. After that, the combined cost falls 
rapidly. In the thirtieth year, the combined ratio is down to 10.16 percent, and 
by the fortieth year it is down to only 8.02 percent, less than two-thirds of the 
original 12.4 percent payroll tax that would otherwise be required to finance 
borrowing from the public by  the social security program. Either of  these would increase the 
unified budget deficit and reduce national saving by an amount that offsets the increased national 
saving in the MIRAs. Of  course, if additional actions were taken to keep the budget deficit un- 
changed, the national saving rate would still increase by the amount of the MIRA accumulations. 
The possibility of these additional changes in government spending or taxes lies beyond the scope 
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the same benefits. These figures imply that an individual who is a young em- 
ployee at the start of privatization pays slightly higher taxes plus contributions 
in the early years but then sharply lower total taxes and contributions during 
later years. Before looking at the implication of such individual time paths for 
the present value of such payments, we consider the effect of the plan on tax- 
payers' behavior and the implications of that response for tax rates and dead- 
weight losses. 
6.5.3  Behavioral Response, Required Tax Rates, and Deadweight Losses 
The existing  payroll  tax  causes employees  to reduce  their  labor  supply 
(broadly defined to include effort, occupational choice, and location as well as 
the number of hours worked) and to substitute untaxed fringe benefits and nicer 
working conditions for taxable cash compensation. We model the reduction in 
taxable payroll earnings as the product of an elasticity and the change in the 
marginal net-of-tax share of wages, that is, as the product of an elasticity and 
"one minus the effective marginal tax rate." The effective marginal tax rate 
includes the federal and state personal income tax rate, the effective state and 
local sales tax rates, and the net payroll tax rate. We assume (quite conserva- 
tively) a rate of 20 percent for the taxes other than the payroll tax. The net 
payroll tax rate is the difference between the payroll tax payment (12.4 percent 
of payroll) and the amount that the individual would have to pay to purchase 
the same benefit at the higher rate of return available in the market. 
The cost of purchasing that benefit is calculated in the following way. If the 
implicit rate of return that the individual earns on social security payroll taxesz3 
is denoted y, a dollar of payroll tax paid at age a could provide a cash benefit 
of (1 + y)65-0  at age sixty-five. If ANN65(y) is the actuarial present value of a 
dollar a year from age sixty-five to death based on a return of  y, the dollar 
of  payroll tax  paid  at  age a  earns an  annuity  starting  at  age sixty-five of 
(1 + y)65-a/ANN65(y). To purchase that same annuity in a private pension 
plan, an employer would have to spend only [(  1 + p)65-"/ANN65(p)]-1,  where 
is the rate of return earned in the private pension alternative. Because pen- 
sion funds do not pay tax on their income, a plausible value for p is the return 
on capital net of corporate and property taxes but before all personal income 
taxes. A pretax real return of 9 percent and a corporate tax rate (including state 
taxes and property taxes) of  40 percent imply p = 5.4 percent.  Since p is 
substantially greater than y, there is a substantial effective tax implied by the 
payroll tax. For example, since someone born in 1960 would receive a return 
on social security taxes of only (y =) 1.39 percent, each dollar of payroll tax 
could be replaced by  only 9.7 cents of contribution to a private pension fund 
at age thirty. This implies that 90.3 percent of the 12.4 percent payroll tax is a 
pure tax since the same benefits could be bought for a private pension contribu- 
23. Recall that this implicit return has declined from 7.0 percent among individuals born before 
1915 to less than 1.5 percent among individuals born after 1960. 237  The Transition Path in Privatizing Social Security 
tion of only 1.2 percent of the individual's payroll. More generally, we define 
the effective payroll tax rate as 
(I - [(l + y)/(l + p.)]"-"[ANN65(~)/ANN65(y)l}~, 
where T,,  is the payroll tax rate (currently 0.124). Alternatively, we can write 
the individual's effective payroll tax rate as T,, -  p, where 
p = [(I + y)/(l  + p.)]65-o[ANN65(p.)/ANN65(y)J~,, 
is the value of the benefit that the individual receives per dollar of incremen- 
tal earnings." 
Combining  this with the marginal personal income tax rate (0) implies a 
net-of-tax share under existing social security rules of  1 -  0 -  T,  + p. We 
denote this net-of-tax  share by No. For example, with 8 = 0.20, y = 0.0139, 
and  p.  = 0.054,  the  net-of-tax  share  for  a  current  thirty-five-year-old  is 
No = 0.688. 
In the MIRA system, the individual would continue to pay a payroll tax to 
meet the remaining pay-as-you-go benefit obligations plus a surcharge to offset 
the revenue lost because individuals reduce their regular payroll tax obligations 
by  the amount of  their MIRA contributions. If we denote this combined tax 
plus surcharge (shown in panel E of table 6.5 as "total payroll tax plus manda- 
tory contribution")  by  ~p",  we can write the individual's net-of-tax share under 
the MIRA system as N, = 1 -  0 -  T,*  + /3  (where p is the same as in the 
current system since the value of the benefits is unchanged by switching to the 
MIRA system). 
At first, the net-of-tax share declines because T,* is greater than the T,, under 
the existing system. After a while, however, the net-of-tax rate rises, and the 
corresponding effective marginal tax rate falls. 
Our assumed elasticity of 0.5 implies that taxable income rises by a factor 
of  [N,/N,,]0.5.  This in  turn  means  that  the  payroll  tax  revenue  collected  by 
tax rate T,, with the initial labor supply can be collected at a lower tax rate 
T; =  T,[N,/N,]-~.~.  Similarly, the personal income tax rate that collects the same 
revenue falls to 8' = 8[N,/N0]-0.5. 
The path of the adjusted tax rates is shown in panels B and C of table 6.6. 
In the first year, the combination of the MIRA surcharge and the unchanged 
payroll tax causes the net-of-tax share to fall and therefore the aggregate labor 
supply to decline. The effect is small and is offset by raising the payroll tax 
rate from 12.40 to 12.46 percent. Similarly, the personal income tax rate must 
be raised only from 20 to 20.10 percent. But, by the eighth year, the payroll 
tax rate is lower than the initial  12.4 percent, and, by year 25, the increased 
taxable labor income causes the payroll tax rate to be lower than it would be 
with no allowance for the change in labor income (i.e., by year 25, the payroll 
24. Our analysis does not classify individuals by  income level and therefore does not distin- 






















































~~  ~ 
12.40  12.39  12.37  12.36  12.33 
12.22  12.16  12.10  12.02  11.93 
11.58  11.43  11.24  11.03  10.82 
10.04  9.73  9.41  9.06  8.69 
7.52  7.09  6.68  6.27  5.85 
6.02  6.23  5.96  5.70  5.42 
4.64  4.39  4.13  3.88  3.63 
2.88  2.64  2.41  2.19  1.98 
1.41  1.25  1.10  .96  33 
.53  .46  .39  .33  .28 
.17  .14  .I1  .09  .08 























12.46  12.46  12.46  12.44  12.43  12.40 
12.32  12.27  12.21  12.13  12.04  11.93 
11.68  11.53  11.32  11.11  10.89  10.64 
10.06  9.74  9.39  9.03  8.63  8.24 
7.40  6.96  6.53  6.11  5.69  5.26 
5.86  6.07  5.80  5.53  5.25  4.98 
4.47  4.22  3.96  3.71  3.47  3.22 
2.74  2.5 1  2.28  2.07  1.87  1.67 
1.33  1.17  1.03  .90  .78  .67 
SO  .43  .36  .3  1  .26  .22 
.I5  .I3  .I0  .08  .07  .05 













































20.14  20.15 
20.19  20.19 
20.14  20.12 
19.93  19.87 
19.51  19.45 
19.42  19.38 
19.17  19.14 
18.96  18.93 
18.80  18.79 
18.72  18.72 
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D. Change in Deadweight Loss Owing to Privatization ($billions) 
-105.52  -107.00  -108.49  -109.92  -111.31  -112.59  -113.69 
-114.63  -115.43  -116.16  -116.82  -117.40  -117.91  -118.37 
-118.77  -119.12  -119.42  -119.68  -119.92  -120.13  -120.32 







-  1.40 
-  1.59 
-1.70 





-  .04 
-  .69 
-1.15 











-  1.46 
-1.63 
-1.71 
-  1.70 







-  1.49 
-  1.65 
-1.72 
-  1.69 
-1.61 
.2 1  .23 
.30  .30 
.I7  .I3 
-.27  -.37 
-1.01  -1.11 
-1.26  -1.33 
-  1.52  -  1.54 
-  1.67  -1.68 
-  1.72  -1.72 
-  1.68  -  I .67 








-  1.69 
-1.72 
-1.66 
-  I .56 
"Panel D of  table 6.5. 
tax rate in panel B of table 6.6 is less than the payroll tax rate in panel D of 
table 6.5). The personal income tax rate in that year is also lower than its no- 
behavioral-response value. 
By year 52, the personal income tax rate is reduced from 20 to 19 percent. 
The payroll  tax  rate  is  also reduced by  one-twentieth, from  2.61 to  2.48 
percent. 
The changes in the rates of payroll tax and income tax cause corresponding 
changes  in  the  deadweight loss  of  the  tax  system. Using  the  traditional 
Harberger-Browning  approximation for the deadweight loss, the change in the 
deadweight loss can be written 
ADWL = 0.5&[t; - #(l - t,)-lwL, 
where WL  is the current payroll tax base, to = 1 -  No, and t, = 1 -  N,. 
Panel D of table 6.6 shows the annual changes in the deadweight loss that 
result from the changes in net-of-tax shares. The annual deadweight loss of the 
tax system initially rises by  about $3.8 billion, an amount equivalent to 0.13 
percent of covered wages (as shown in panel E of table 6.6). At its maximum, 
the increased deadweight loss is 0.30 percent of payroll (in years 11 and 12). 
By year 23 (2017), the shift to an MIRA system is reducing the deadweight. 
The decline in the overall deadweight loss of the tax system rises rapidly to 
$53 billion in 2028, $100 billion in 2048, etc. In the final year of the simula- 
tions, the reduced deadweight loss is 1.56 percent of covered wages. 
Putting the pieces together, the analysis in table 6.5 and 6.6 shows that, in 
the long run, privatization reduces the burden on employees from a 12.4 per- 240  Martin Feldstein and Andrew Samwick 
cent payroll tax in  the current pay-as-you-go system to a mandatory MIRA 
contribution of 2.04 percent of payroll (panel B of table 6.5)25  and reduces the 
deadweight loss of  the income and payroll taxes by  1.57 percent of payroll 
(panel E of  table 6.6). The combined gain to individuals is the sum of the 
reduction in the cash contributions (12.4 percent -  2.04 percent = 10.36 per- 
cent of  payroll) and the reduction in the deadweight loss of the tax system 
(1.56 percent of payroll) for a combined gain of 11.92 percent of payroll. The 
long-run gain is thus equal to almost the entire current tax paid by employers 
and employees and is achieved without any reduction in the retirement benefits 
below what could be purchased with the current 12.4 percent payroll tax. 
In the earlier years of the transition, the net effect on real disposable income 
(adjusted for the change in the deadweight loss) is at first negative and then 
becomes a positive gain. Thus, in the first year, there is (1) no effect on the 
payroll tax rate,26  (2) an MIRA surcharge of 0.69 percent, and (3) an increased 
deadweight loss of 0.13 percent of payroll. The total burden rises by 0.82 per- 
cent of payroll to 13.22 percent. By year 15, (1) the payroll tax rate is down to 
11.7 percent, a decline of  0.7 percent of  payroll, (2) the MIRA surcharge is 
2.00 percent of  payroll, and (3)  the deadweight loss of  the tax system is in- 
creased by 0.28 percent of payroll. The total burden rises by only 1.58 percent 
of  payroll. But, by  year 25, the real disposable  income is higher under the 
MIRA system: the payroll tax is only 9.41 percent, the MIRA surcharge 2.76 
percent; the combined  12.17 percent rate implies that the deadweight loss is 
reduced (a reduction of 0.18 percent of payroll), implying a net burden of 11.99 
percent of payroll. After that, the net burden falls rapidly, By year 35, the com- 
bination of  the payroll tax and the MIRA surcharge is only 7.87 percent of 
payroll, and the deadweight loss reduction is 1.21 percent of payroll, implying 
a net burden of 6.66 percent of payroll and therefore a net gain of 5.74 percent 
of payroll. 
Looking at the aggregate gains and losses (i.e., multiplying these percentage 
of  payroll changes by the aggregate payroll) shows that the present value of 
the changes during the first forty-one years is positive at any real discount rate 
of 5 percent or less. As the horizon extends beyond forty-one years, the present 
value of the changes becomes increasingly positive. Even with a very high real 
discount rate of 7 percent, the present value of the changes is positive for any 
horizon of fifty-one years or more. The shift to a privatized plan with MIRA 
accounts using the transition path analyzed in this section thus has a positive 
aggregate present value for all plausible discount rates and does so even if the 
horizon is limited to only fifty-one years. 
25. The actual long-run MIRA contribution is reduced from 2.04 to  1.94 percent of payroll 
because the lower marginal tax  rates cause an  increase in  payroll income. The correct way  to 
compare the reduced cash tax burden (Le., the effect on net income) is, however, to use the payroll 
tax rate on the initial base. 
26.  To  calculate the change in real disposable income, it is appropriate to use the tax rate that 
would be applied to the original tax base (12.40 percent) rather than the tax rate that would be 
applied to the slightly reduced tax base (12.46 percent). Of course, the deadweight loss calculation 
does use the higher tax rate. 241  The Transition Path in Privatizing Social Security 
The next section discusses what happens to the individual initial age cohorts 
during this transition. 
6.5.4  The Effects of the Transition on Different Age Cohorts 
The transition  option  that  we  have been  analyzing  is more  favorable  to 
younger employees (and, of course, to future generations) than to those who 
are currently in middle age or near retirement. An analysis of the distribution 
of  gains by the current age cohorts is interesting in itself and shows that the 
gains and losses cannot be redistributed among the initial generation of  em- 
ployees in a way that makes everyone better off. It also shows that the present 
value of the losses to those in the initial generation of employees who do lose 
are relatively very small. 
To study this, we calculate the lifetime path of the payroll taxes, MIRA sur- 
charges, and deadweight loss changes for a representative individual in each 
age cohort from age five to age sixty.*’ For each individual, the net gain in each 
year is the difference between the payroll tax (in constant 1995 dollars) that 
the individual would pay at the 12.4 percent rate in the current pay-as-you-go 
system and the sum of the payroll tax, the MIRA surcharge, and the dead- 
weight loss change under the MIRA system. 
Table 6.7 shows the resulting paths  of net gains for individuals who are 
twenty-five, forty, and fifty-five years old in 1995, the assumed first year of the 
program. Note that the twenty-five-year-olds are affected for forty years while 
the forty- and fifty-five-year-olds are affected for shorter periods  until  they 
retire at age sixty-five. 
During the first two decades, each of these representative individuals incurs 
a small loss, exceeding 2 percent  of payroll  only for the oldest age group. 
When the current twenty-five-year-olds reach age fifty, they begin to have posi- 
tive annual benefits. 
Table 6.8 summarizes the actuarial present values of these annual effects of 
privatization on representative individuals in each initial age cohort from five 
through sixty years old. Estimates are presented for three different real dis- 
count rates. The common feature among all these figures is that they are quite 
small for existing employees (aged twenty through sixty), indicating that the 
transition generations do not pay a large price for the benefits that will accrue 
to future generations. 
With a real discount rate of 3 percent, the initial cohort of  fifty-year-olds 
incurs lifetime losses with an actuarial present value of $4,680. The lifetime 
gains to those who are twenty years old when privatization begins are worth 
27. The representative individual is someone with mean earnings for that age cohort.  The issues 
associated with income distribution and the redistribution of the current social security program 
to individuals with low lifetime covered earnings are discussed in sec. 6.6. 
The changes in the deadweight losses involve the approximating assumption that all the change 
in the deadweight loss that results from the changes in the marginal tax rates faced by the individ- 
ual accrues to that individual. While this is true when there is no preexisting tax rate, part of the 
gain that results from a change in an  existing tax rate accrues to the government in the form of 
additional revenue. Our calculation implicitly assumes that this is returned to the individual. 242  Martin Feldstein and Andrew Samwick 
Table 6.7  Net Gains (% of payroll) from Phase-In Partial Privatization 
(by cohort) 
Age in 1995 = 25 
I995  -  .08  -.I8  -.28  -  .37  -.47  -1.06  -1.15 
2002  -1.25  -1.33  -1.40  -1.47  -1.51  -1.55  -1.55 
2009  -1.55  -1.54  -1.50  -1.38  -1.25  -1.11  -  .94 
2016  -.72  -  .48  -.21  .08  .42  .90  1.35 
2023  1.85  2.34  2.87  3.38  3.87  4.36  4.86 
2030  5.35  4.12  3.83  4.11  4.39  .oo  .oo 
Age in 1995 = 40 
1995  -.82  -.94  -1.07  -1.19  -1.31  -1.42  -1.53 
2002  -1.64  -1.73  -1.81  -1.89  -1.95  -1.99  -2.01 
2009  -2.02  -2.02  -1.99  -1.89  -1.77  -1.65  -1.49 
2016  -1.29  -1.07  -.82  -.54  .oo  .oo  .oo 
Age in 1995 = 55 
1995  -1.39  -1.53  -1.66  -1.79  -1.92  -2.04  -2.16 
2002  -2.27  -2.36  -2.45  -  .oo  -  .00  -  .oo  -  .oo 
Table 6.8  Actuarial Present Values of Net Gains from Phase-In 
Partial Privatization 
Thousands of Dollars per Worker  % of Future Wages 
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-1.17 
-  1.49 
-  1.70 
-1.83 





-  .08 
-.51 
-.92 
-  1.20 
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$4,420 in present value.  But those who have not yet joined the labor force 
can look forward to substantially larger gains: $9,380 for fifteen-year-olds and 
$14,440 for ten-year-olds. 
Although  different phase-in  schedules or age-related  payroll  taxes could 
change this pattern, there is no way in which all age cohorts in the labor force 
at the time of  privatization  can be made better off. The cumulative present 243  The Transition Path in Privatizing Social Security 
value for all those  age twenty  to  sixty-five at the time of  privatization  is 
clearly negative.28 
The result would, however, look quite different if we took the nuclear family 
as the unit of  observation for our analysis. Consider a couple of  which the 
husband and wife are both aged forty-five with two children aged ten and fif- 
teen. Although the forty-five-year-olds have a combined net present value loss 
of  $11,680 (at a 3 percent discount rate), this is outweighed by  the children’s 
gains of  more than $23,000. Younger families would tend to be even bigger 
gainers. 
6.5.5 
Throughout this section, the analysis has assumed that MIRA contributions 
earn a real return equal to the full 9 percent pretax marginal product of capital. 
To  achieve this, the federal and state governments would have to contribute to 
each MIRA account an amount estimated to be the corporate taxes collected 
on the incremental capital represented by that account. In the current analysis, 
which has ignored fluctuations in stock and bond prices, this would be about 
3.6 percent of the assets in each account. 
Although a proper accounting of the effects of the MIRA contributions does 
require attributing the additional corporate tax collections to the MIRA ac- 
counts, in practice the government may not be willing to make such a transfer 
and may  use the increased corporate tax revenue to fund other government 
spending or tax reductions. It is worthwhile therefore to ask what the MIRA 
contributions would have to be if the real return earned by the MIRA accounts 
is limited to the 5.4 percent that is net of corporate tax payments (and therefore 
that could be earned directly by investing in the market mixture of equity and 
debt). 
The long-run effect is to raise the required MIRA contribution from 2.04 
percent of payroll to 3.3  1 percent of payroll, that is, slightly less than in inverse 
proportion to the decline in the rate of return. Panel €3  of table 6.9 shows that 
this same almost exact inverse proportion relation holds for each year in the 
transition. Thus, even with this much-reduced return, the long-run mandatory 
contribution is reduced by almost three-fourths of the current 12.4 percent tax 
rate. Moreover, during the transition, the combination of the payroll tax plus 
mandatory contribution rises only from the current 12.4 percent to a maximum 
of  14.8 percent after fourteen years (panel E of table 6.9) and is permanently 
down below  12.4 percent after twenty-eight years. 
We  reiterate, however, that this is looking at the pension contributions in 
Effect of a Lower Return on MIRA Contributions 
28. It  would of course be possible to create what appears to be a Pareto-improving privatization 
by  combining social security privatization with another fundamental reform (e.g.,  the shift from 
an  income tax  to a consumption tax) and distributing the gains from that reform in  a way  that 
causes the combination of the two reforms to make everyone better off. Since the tax reform could 
be done separately, the Pareto improvement cannot properly be attributed to the privatization of 





















































A. Mandatory Individual Contributions ($billions) 
38.88  43.85  49.05  54.47  60.05 
77.67  83.84  90.30  96.70  103.21 
123.46  130.07  136.09  142.28  148.59 
166.64  172.45  178.19  183.76  183.56 
183.38  183.06  182.83  182.85  183.00 
184.68  186.13  187.38  188.55  189.52 
193.21  194.76  196.16  197.49  198.93 
202.97  204.24  205.49  206.86  208.39 
212.94  214.55  216.11  217.52  218.97 
224.28  226.28  228.39  230.61  232.93 












B. Mandatory Individual Contributions (% of  Payroll) 
1.17  1.30  1.44  1.58  1.73  1.87  2.01 
2.15  2.29  2.43  2.57  2.7 I  2.84  2.97 
3.11  3.24  3.36  3.47  3.58  3.69  3.80 
3.90  3.99  4.08  4.17  4.25  4.20  4.16 
4.11  4.06  4.01  3.95  3.91  3.87  3.83 
3.79  3.77  3.75  3.73  3.70  3.68  3.65 
3.63  3.61  3.60  3.58  3.56  3.55  3.53 
3.52  3.50  3.48  3.46  3.45  3.44  3.42 
3.41  3.40  3.39  3.38  3.36  3.35  3.34 
3.33  3.32  3.31  3.3 1  3.30  3.30  3.30 












C. Benefits Replaced Owing to Privatization ($billions) 
.13  .38  .78  1.35  2.18 
6.22  8.25  10.62  13.57  17.03 
31.17  37.29  45.26  53.82  63.07 
97.86  111.70  126.74  143.23  160.99 
218.93  240.74  262.44  284.59  307.56 
310.24  303.98  320.95  338.42  356.61 
411.53  430.08  449.32  468.52  487.90 
548.06  568.03  587.98  607.72  627.03 
682.81  700.46  717.66  734.44  750.59 
795.15  808.95  822.37  835.40  848.07 












D. Payroll Tax Needed to Maintain Trust Fund Trajectory (% of Payroll) 
12.40  12.40  12.39  12.37  12.36 
12.26  12.22  12.16  12.10  12.02 
11.70  11.58  11.43  11.24  1 1.03 
10.32  10.04  9.73  9.41  9.06 
7.92  7.52  7.09  6.68  6.27 
5.00  6.02  6.23  5.96  5.70 
4.89  4.64  4.39  4.13  3.88 
3.13  2.88  2.64  2.41  2.19 
12.33  12.30 
11.93  11.82 
10.82  10.59 
8.69  8.32 
5.85  5.43 
5.42  5.15 
3.63  3.37 
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Table 6.9  (continued) 
~~~~ 
D. Payroll Tax Needed to Maintain Trust Fund Trajectory (% of Payroll) 
205 1  1.58  1.41  1.25  1.10  .96  .83  .72 
2058  .62  .53  .46  .39  .33  .28  .24 
2065  .20  .17  .I4  .ll  .09  .08  .06 












13.57  13.70  13.83  13.96  14.08  14.20  14.31 
14.42  14.50  14.59  14.67  14.72  14.77  14.79 
14.81  14.81  14.79  14.71  14.62  14.51  14.38 
14.22  14.03  13.82  13.58  13.31  12.89  12.48 
12.03  11.57  11.10  10.63  10.18  9.72  9.25 
8.79  9.79  9.98  9.69  9.40  9.10  8.80 
8.52  8.25  7.99  7.71  7.44  7.17  6.91 
6.64  6.38  6.12  5.87  5.63  5.41  5.20 
4.99  4.81  4.64  4.47  4.32  4.18  4.06 
3.95  3.85  3.77  3.70  3.64  3.58  3.54 
3.50  3.47  3.44  3.42  3.40  3.38  3.37 
isolation and ignores the favorable effect on revenue elsewhere in the system. 
A complete accounting requires crediting the additional corporate tax revenue. 
6.6  Distributional Considerations:  Protecting the Poor 
The method of calculating social security benefits in the current unfunded 
system is designed to provide some redistribution from individuals with high 
lifetime earnings to those with low lifetime earnings. In practice, this redistri- 
bution is attenuated and in some cases reversed because of a variety of ways 
in which low- and high-income individuals differ. Low-wage workers gener- 
ally enter the full-time labor force at an earlier age, have higher mortality rates, 
and are more likely to be in two-earner families. Each of these characteristics 
reduces the implicit rate of return on the household's social security  In 
order to prevent poverty in old age, the regular social security program is cur- 
rently augmented by the means-tested supplemental security income (SSI) pro- 
gram. The SSI program could of course be continued in parallel to a privatized 
social security system, a subject that we will not pursue further here.30 
A privatized system of individual funded accounts is explicitly nonredistrib- 
29.  On the relation between social security net transfers and income distribution, see Hurd and 
Shoven (1985). 
30. The combination in the SSI program of  an  age test in addition to  a means test reduces 
the problem of  the work disincentive associated with means-tested welfare programs for younger 
workers. The SSI means test still creates incentives to reduce saving during working years. It also 
encourages low-wage workers to work in the underground economy to avoid social security payroll 
taxes since any resulting increase in social security benefits would be fully offset by lower SSI pay- 
ments. 246  Martin Feldstein and Andrew Samwick 
utive. Each individual receives income after age sixty-five on the basis of that 
individual’s MIRA contributions. It is worth stressing, however, that the MIRA 
system would make low-income workers much better off after the transition 
than they would be with the current unfunded system. The reason for this is 
that, instead of a payroll tax of  12.4 percent, they would pay an MIRA contri- 
bution of only about 2 percent of payroll. They would receive the benefit of a 
tax cut equal to 10 percent of income. 
A modification  of  the basic MIRA system might permit individuals with 
below-average  earnings to make voluntary contributions, perhaps limited by 
the level that would provide the same benefits that they would have received 
under  the  existing  social security  system. A  lower-income  individual  who 
earns the equivalent of a 4 percent rate of return under the unfunded system 
(because of  its redistributive  features) could make MIRA contributions that 
achieved that level of benefits and still enjoy a substantial net tax reduction.” 
Although we do not pursue this possibility, we do want to address the ques- 
tion of  how the system of individual accounts could be modified in a simple 
way  so that no individual is left with an unacceptably low annuity. For this 
purpose, we define unacceptably low to mean less than half the average annu- 
ity. The calculations that we report in this section show that a very small tax 
transfer at retirement would be sufficient to provide all retirees with at least 
this level of retirement annuity.32 
Since the size of  each individual’s accumulated MIRA funds at age sixty- 
five depends on the entire annual pattern  of earnings from age thirty to age 
sixty-five, the frequency and extent to which the MIRA accounts at age sixty- 
five fall below  half  the  mean  account cannot be inferred from single cross 
sections of earnings. We therefore use the Social Security New Beneficiaries 
Survey, a unique data set that provides the necessary lifetime earnings histor- 
ies. More specifically, the data are a sample of all persons who began receiving 
social security retirement benefits between June 1980 and May 1981. For each 
person in the sample, social security earnings histories are available beginning 
with  1951. Since most  people  in the  sample  were between  thirty-two and 
thirty-six  in  1951 (88 percent  of  the  sample were born  between  1915 and 
1919), we assumed that the real earnings between age thirty  and the age in 
195  1 were the same as the actual earnings in 195  1. All nominal dollar amounts 
are restated to 1996 dollars using the CPI. Since the rate of  MIRA contribu- 
tions varies over time during the transition, we calculate the long-run value of 
the annual MIRA contributions as shown in panel D of table 6.5, that is, 2.04 
3 1. Workers born in 1945 who have a dependent spouse and who earn half the median income 
would receive an actuarial return of about 3.5 percent on the taxes that they and their employer pay. 
32.  We are grateful to Jeffrey Liebman for making the calculations that we report in this section. 
The current analysis does not deal with differences in rates of return that different individuals in 
the same age cohort would earn on their savings. To the extent that this reflects voluntary decisions 
to hold different types of portfolios because of differences in risk preferences, it may not be appro- 
priate to compensate individuals with low outcomes (other than through the means-tested SSI 
program). We return to the subject of return uncertainty in the next section. 247  The Transition Path in Privatizing Social Security 
percent of the amount of earnings up to the annual social security maximum 
covered earnings. 
Among men who retired in 1980-81,  MIRA contributions of 2.04 percent 
of their earnings from age thirty would have accumulated (at a 9 percent real 
rate of return) to a mean value of $82,985 in 1981 at the  1996 price 
Approximately 19 percent of such accumulated MIRA accounts had less than 
half  this  amount. The average shortfall  among these  accounts,  that  is, the 
amount that must be added to these accounts to bring them up to half the mean 
account, was $3,889.34  The aggregate amount of this shortfall is thus equivalent 
to only 4.7 percent of the total of  all MIRA accounts at age sixty-five. This 
implies that increasing each MIRA contribution by 4.7 percent, that is, from 
the 2.04 percent of covered earnings reported as the long-run value in panel E 
of table 6.5 to 2.14 percent of covered earnings, and then levying a “tax” of 
4.7 percent on all accounts at age sixty-five would provide the funds to pre- 
clude any account from having less than half the mean account while keeping 
the mean net-of-tax annuity equal to the level of social security benefits pro- 
jected in current law (with the solvency correction described above).35 
This calculation of an additional 0.10 percent of payroll MIRA contribution 
and the associated tax on the accumulated accounts assumes that levying the 
tax and providing the transfer would not alter individuals’ incentives to earn. 
Even if this had to be adjusted because of incentive effects, the implication is 
clear that “unacceptably low” accumulations can be avoided with a relatively 
small tax and transfer. The distributional issue, judged in this way, need not be 
an impediment to privatized individual MIRA accounts. 
6.7  Risks: Uncertain Returns and Imperfect Annuity Markets 
Until now we have ignored the problem that funded MIRA accounts involve 
risky investments. Of course, the current unfunded pay-as-you-go system is 
also risky, although in a very different way.  Despite the reforms of  1983, it 
is clear that the existing system cannot pay the “promised” benefits. Many 
33. To put this number in perspective, note that, with a 9 percent real return, such an accumu- 
lated amount would produce an annuity of about $9,950 a year. For comparison, the average annual 
social security benefit in 1980 (in 1996 dollars) of a retired worker was $7,795, that of a retired 
worker and wife $12,928. 
34.  There are two reasons why this overstates the cost of  assuring that everyone has a fund 
equal to at least half the mean fund. First, many of the low social security individuals would now 
be eligible for SSI benefits, which would help defray the cost of increasing the fund. Second, many 
of those with low social security earnings are individuals who had spent most of their careers in 
the federal government or in state governments that provide pensions and remain outside the social 
security system. 
35.  This calculation is based on the earnings of men only, even in two-earner couples. Applying 
the same method of accumulation to the earnings of husbands and wives in a pooled account leads 
to similar conclusions. The mean accumulated MIRA account based on 2.04 percent of husbands’ 
and wives’ earnings was $104,511 in  1986 dollars. Only  19.2 percent of MIRA accounts had 
less than half this total, with a mean shortfall of $4,204, corresponding to a 4.2 percent tax on 
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younger persons say that they believe that social security benefits will not be 
there when they retire. Legislative proposals involve reducing all benefits, tax- 
ing the benefits of higher-income recipients, and other changes that would re- 
duce the real value of the benefits for some individuals very substantially. This 
section focuses on the risks of the funded MIRA accounts and asks how indi- 
viduals could be protected from such risks. 
Although the real pretax return on the nonfinancial corporate capital stock 
has averaged somewhat more than 9 percent since 1960, there are substantial 
year-to-year  fluctuations in the return earned by portfolio investors. If MIRA 
contributions are based on the expected 9 percent return (as in the calculations 
of sec. 6.5 above), an individual who is fortunate enough to save and contribute 
to an MIRA account during years when the stock and bond markets are rela- 
tively low and to retire and dissave when those markets are relatively high will 
enjoy a level of benefits greater than those provided by the pay-as-you-go so- 
cial security system (as well as having paid a much lower cost of financing that 
benefit). Conversely, an individual who retires when the level of stock prices 
is relatively low will receive annuity payments that are less than those provided 
by the pay-as-you-go system if the MIRA contributions  are based on an as- 
sumed 9 percent return. 
The lifetime return in an MIRA account that is invested in the market’s debt- 
equity mixture is almost certain to exceed the return in the pay-as-you-go un- 
funded social security  Nevertheless, the existing variability of returns 
does mean that an individual who contributes on the basis of  an expected 9 
percent return could have very much lower retirement income if the ex post 
return is substantially lower. 
This market fluctuation risk is compounded by the inability to purchase ac- 
tuarially fair variable annuities based on the return earned by the market’s debt- 
equity mixture. Without such an annuity, individuals must save enough to fi- 
nance more than the total benefits that they expect to receive or must accept 
the risk of a much-reduced  level of consumption if they live longer than the 
normal life expectancy. Although the life expectancy for men at age sixty-five 
is now nearly  sixteen years, 33 percent of  sixty-five-year-old  men live more 
than an additional twenty years, and 5 percent live more than thirty years. 
Although the introduction of a universal system of MIRA accounts might 
lead to market innovations that ameliorate the market risk (e.g., the availability 
of long-term put options) and the annuity risk (e.g., the availability of actuari- 
ally fair variable annuities), we have explored how the MIRA program might 
36.  This is similar to MaCurdy and Shoven’s (1992) conclusion that individuals who invested 
in equities are almost certain to receive a higher rate of return than those who invested in bonds 
or money market instruments. They show that lifetime equity returns have been better than debt 
return for individuals who began their life-cycle saving in every year for more than three quarters 
of a century. MacCurdy and Shoven’s analysis takes the amount of saving as given and shows that 
the equity returns have dominated in the past. That is, of course, separate from the question of 
how much an individual should save. 249  The Transition Path in Privatizing Social Security 
be adjusted in the current institutional context in which such products are not 
available. Our approach does not seek an  optimal adjustment of  the MIRA 
program to the risks that we have identified. Instead, we have imposed a very 
demanding  requirement on  the  MIRA  accounts by  asking  the  following 
question: 
In the absence of any annuity, and given the historic market uncertainty of 
returns on debt and equity, how much would individuals have to contribute 
to MIRA accounts to be able to receive the baseline level of social security 
benefits with probability 0.95 even if they might live to age one hundred? 
Individuals who will receive some pay-as-you-go social security benefits 
during the transition are partially protected from these risks. In the long run, 
however, individuals will be wholly dependent on MIRA accounts for their 
retirement income.37  We  believe that the right strategy for individuals in this 
situation would be to “oversave,” that is, to contribute more to their MIRA 
accounts than would be necessary to fund the target level of  benefits if they 
knew that they would obtain a 9 percent rate of return with certainty. We have 
done some preliminary calculations that suggest that the contributions required 
achieve a probability of 95 percent of obtaining retirement income equal to the 
social security benefits would be very much less than the pay-as-you-go rate.3s 
Raising the average MIRA contributions in this way implies that individuals 
will generally die with  substantial balances in their MIRA accounts. These 
extra MIRA contributions are returned to the next generation as either private 
bequests or tax revenues (if bequests from the MIRA accounts are not permit- 
ted and are taxed at death). In exchange for the resulting bequests, the subse- 
quent generation might agree to reinsure the individuals against the “5 percent” 
risk that the combination of poor average stock and bond market performance 
for their age cohort and above-average longevity of the individual causes funds 
to be exhausted. This might be formalized by  a government reinsurance ar- 
rangement. Such possibilities will not be explored further here. 
In future work we will present simulations of the time path of  the MIRA 
asset for someone who starts contributing to the MIRA at age thirty, works 
until age sixty-five, and then dissaves the social security baseline benefits from 
age sixty-five until death. We  repeat the simulation one thousand times and 
note the fraction of times that the individual still has positive MIRA assets at 
death. We  will identify that rate of  MIRA calculations that implies that 95 
percent of individuals die with positive assets. 
In concluding this discussion of risk, we reiterate that this calculation is not 
37.  Individuals could of course continue to have private pensions, voluntary IRAs, and volun- 
tary 401(k)  accounts. By being wholly dependent on the MIRA account, we mean only that they 
will not receive any unfunded social security benefits. 
38. Some calculations presented at the conference and in  NBER Working Paper no. 5761, on 
which this chapter is based, contained an error that caused the required contributions to be under- 
stated. Subsequent work indicates that the correct calculation will still imply contributions that are 
still very much less than the pay-as-you-go  tax rates. 250  Martin Feldstein and Andrew Samwick 
presented as an optimal response to the market risk and annuity risk; rather, it 
is intended to provide a framework for calculating the contribution rate neces- 
sary to maintain the full baseline benefits and to show that this can be achieved 
with a relatively small increase in the MIRA contributions, one that still leaves 
the MIRA contributions less than the existing payroll tax.3y 
6.8  An Alternative Baseline for Social Security: Modifying the 
Inflation Indexing 
For the simulation in sections 6.5-6.7,  the benefits correspond to the for- 
mula in the existing social security law until the trust fund is exhausted in 2030 
and then drop sharply to the level of benefits that can be financed with the 12.4 
percent payroll tax. This sharp drop in benefits in the year 2030 is the simplest 
case to analyze, but it is not the most realistic. A more plausible assumption is 
that, whether or not social security is privatized, the growth of benefits will be 
reduced gradually by reducing the annual inflation indexing of  benefit^.^^ 
Reducing the annual indexing of benefits by 1 percentage point causes the 
aggregate level of social security benefits to decline eventually by about 9 per- 
cent. The decline does not continue beyond this level because the modification 
of  indexing only affects postretirement benefits,  not the level of benefits of 
new retirees. 
The effect of this temporarily lower rate of growth of social security benefits 
depends on how the resulting funds are used. We assume that the path of the 
trust fund is kept unchanged and therefore that the payroll tax is reduced. This 
makes the transition to the MIRA system more attractive to the initial genera- 
tion of  employees  as well as reducing the relative magnitude of the benefit 
reduction in 2030 when the trust fund is exhausted. 
Panel A of table 6.10 shows the percentage reduction in benefits that results 
from the  1 percentage point adjustment to the indexing. At the end of  seven 
years, aggregate benefits are 4.64 percent lower, and, at the end of twenty-one 
years, they are 7.97 percent lower. After 2030, the benefit reduction is the same 
relative to existing law as we showed in table 6.4.41 
Table 6.11 presents our standard analysis of  the time path of payroll taxes 
and MIRA surcharges for the policy of adjusting retiree benefits by 1 percent 
less than the increase in the consumer price index. Since future benefits (before 
2030) will be lower than they would be with full CPI indexing, the required 
39.  One plausible modification would reduce benefits in any year in which the accumulated 
assets are less than some threshold fraction (e.g., 70 percent) of the predicted MIRA account value 
for that year. 
40. The Senate Finance Committee has appointed an expert committee to consider how the 
indexing of  social security benefits should be modified to be consistent with the true increase in 
the cost of living (see Boskin et al. 1996). For an earlier advocacy of such an inflation adjustment, 
see Feldstein and Feldstein (1984). 
41.  We discontinue the indexing adjustment after the benefit reduction in 2030. 251  The Transition Path in Privatizing Social Security 
Table 6.10  Partial Indexation: Trust Fund and Solvency Adjustment 
























































2.60  3.35  4.02  4.64 
6.57  6.91  7.20  7.40 
7.92  7.94  7.97  7.97 
8.01  8.01  8.00  8.05 
8.23  8.31  8.41  8.5 1 
24.22  24.34  24.46  24.24 
23.30  23.18  23.10  23.08 
23.74  24.06  24.40  24.80 
27.25  27.94  28.64  29.32 
31.82  32.32  32.77  33.18 
34.43  34.67  34.89  35.08 














































































MIRA contributions and required payroll tax are smaller than they would oth- 
erwise be. Since this affects only the transition before 2030, in the very long 
run the tax and MIRA contributions are essentially unchanged from the case 
of full indexing. Table 6.12 shows the analogous calculations of the resulting 
shift in labor supply and the change in the deadweight loss of the payroll tax. 
Perhaps most interesting are the disaggregated analyses for representative 
individuals that are presented in tables 6.13 and 6.14. With this CPI-minus- 
one adjustment of benefits, the actuarial present value of  the change in real 
disposable income is positive for all current individuals who are younger than 
thirty years of  age. The present value losses for those who are older are sub- 
stantially less than they are with no benefit adjustment before 2030.42  The max- 
imum loss occurs for forty-five-year-olds, and, at a 3 percent real discount rate, 
the loss for a couple is $6,560. If  the couple has two children aged ten and 
fifteen, the net gain for the nuclear family would be more than $25,000. 
42.  Of course, these individuals will receive lower benefits at retirement than under current law. 
But that is common to the pay-as-you-go and privatized systems if  the CPI adjustment will be 





















































A. Mandatory Individual Contributions ($billions) 
21.76  24.69  27.82  31.14  34.58 
45.92  50.03  54.41  58.81  63.37 
77.72  82.59  86.83  9 1.26  95.84 
108.77  112.87  116.81  120.44  120.11 
119.37  118.68  117.98  117.50  117.13 
117.11  118.10  118.88  119.58  120.03 
122.29  123.42  124.33  125.21  126.20 
128.60  129.28  129.89  130.58  131.44 
133.78  134.61  135.35  135.87  136.38 
138.89  139.94  141.10  142.35  143.70 













B. Mandatory Individual Contributions (% of  Payroll) 
.65  .73  .8  1  .90 
1.26  1.35  1.45  1.55 
1.94  2.04  2.14  2.22 
2.53  2.60  2.67  2.73 
2.68  2.64  2.60  2.55 
2.41  2.39  2.38  2.36 
2.29  2.29  2.28  2.27 
2.14  2.14  2.13  2.11 
2.06  2.06  2.05  2.04 
2.03  2.03  2.04  2.04 
.99  1.08  1.17 
1.65  1.74  1.84 
2.30  2.38  2.46 
2.79  2.75  2.72 
2.5 1  2.47  2.44 
2.35  2.33  2.31 
2.26  2.25  2.24 
2.10  2.09  2.07 
2.04  2.04  2.04 
2.04  2.04  2.04 
C. Benefits Replaced Owing to Privatization ($billions) 
.  00  .I3  .38  .78  1.34  2.16  3.20 
4.44  6.10  8.08  10.37  13.21  16.55  20.70 
25.12  30.15  35.99  43.66  51.86  60.68  70.56 
8 1.72  93.74  106.84  121.06  136.64  153.40  170.19 
188.59  207.61  227.96  248.15  268.62  289.78  311.54 
334.04  310.24  303.98  320.95  338.42  356.61  375.26 
393.42  411.53  430.08  449.32  468.52  487.90  507.68 
527.69  548.06  568.03  587.98  607.72  627.03  646.30 
664.97  682.81  700.46  717.66  734.44  750.59  766.05 
780.86  795.15  808.95  822.37  835.40  848.07  860.44 
872.55  884.37  896.00  907.47  918.83  930.10  941.30 
D. Payroll Tax Needed to Maintain Trust Fund Trajectory (% of  Payroll) 
12.40  12.29  12.19  12.09 
11.68  11.57  1 1.47  11.36 
10.83  10.68  10.50  10.30 
9.35  9.06  8.75  8.42 
6.93  6.53  6.10  5.70 
4.06  6.02  6.23  5.96 
4.89  4.64  4.39  4.13 
3.13  2.88  2.64  2.41 
1.58  1.41  1.25  1.10 
11.98  11.88  11.78 
11.24  11.11  10.97 
10.09  9.87  9.63 
8.07  7.70  7.32 
5.30  4.89  4.48 
5.70  5.42  5.15 
3.88  3.63  3.37 
2.19  1.98  1.77 
.96  .83  .72 253  The Transition Path in Privatizing Social Security 














D. Payroll Tax Needed to Maintain Trust Fund Trajectory (% of Payroll) 
.62  .53  .46  .39  .33  .28  .24 












E. Total Payroll Tax Plus Mandatory Contribution (% of Payroll) 
13.02  13.00  12.98  12.97  12.96 
12.93  12.92  12.90  12.88  12.85 
12.72  12.64  12.52  12.39  12.25 
11.66  11.42  11.15  10.85  10.44 
9.17  8.70  8.26  7.81  7.37 
8.41  8.61  8.33  8.05  7.75 
6.93  6.67  6.40  6.14  5.88 
5.09  4.84  4.60  4.36  4.14 
3.55  3.38  3.21  3.06  2.92 
2.59  2.51  2.43  2.37  2.32 












6.9  Maintaining Current Law Benefits 
Our final analysis deals with the possibility of maintaining the level of bene- 
fits specified by current law. The future insolvency of the existing social secu- 
rity system will force a reduction in benefits unless taxes are raised dramati- 
cally or a much higher return is earned on individual contributions. Unlike the 
previous sections of this paper, we now explore the role of the MIRA system 
if the level of benefits implied by current law is to be maintained. 
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 showed that, with the current pay-as-you-go  system, the 
trust fund is projected to be exhausted in 2030 (panel B of table 6.3) and that 
benefits must be reduced by 24 percent in 2032 if they are to be financed by 
the revenue produced by a 12.4 percent tax. The benefit reduction consistent 
with a 12.4 percent tax rises to 35 percent by the last year of the projections 
(207 1). These numbers imply that maintaining the level of benefits implied by 
current law would require raising the tax by 31 percent in 2032 (from 12.4 to 
16.3 percent) and then continuing to raise the tax rate, reaching  19.1 percent 
in 207 1  .43 
The MIRA system would permit benefits to be maintained at the level pro- 
vided by  current law with  a long-run  MIRA contribution  rate of  only 3.15 
percent (instead of  the 2.04 percent required to finance the level of  benefits 
that  would result from maintaining  the  12.4 percent payroll  tax). Thus, the 
MIRA contributions rise in approximately the same proportion as the payroll 
43.  This calculation ignores the effect of the higher tax rate on labor supply and taxable income. 
Because the shift from a 12.4 to a 19.1 percent tax rate would reduce taxable income, a higher rate 
would be necessary to offset the resulting reduction in payroll and income tax revenue. Table 6.12  Effect of Phase-In Partial Privatization  on Tax Base and DWL 
Partial Indexation and Solvency Adjustment 
~  ~~~~~ 
A. Payroll Tax Needed to Maintain Trust Fund with No Behavioral Response” 
1995  12.40  12.29  12.19  12.09  11.98  11.88  11.78 
2002  1 1.68  11.57  1 1.47  11.36  11.24  11.11  10.97 
2009  10.83  10.68  10.50  10.30  10.09  9.87  9.63 
2016  9.35  9.06  8.75  8.42  8.07  7.70  7.32 
2023  6.93  6.53  6.10  5.70  5.30  4.89  4.48 
2030  4.06  6.02  6.23  5.96  5.70  5.42  5.15 
2037  4.89  4.64  4.39  4.13  3.88  3.63  3.37 
2044  3.13  2.88  2.64  2.41  2.19  1.98  1.77 
205 1  1.58  1.41  1.25  1.10  .96  .83  .72 
2058  .62  .53  .46  .39  .33  .28  .24 
2065  .20  .I7  .I4  .I1  .09  .08  .06 
B. New Payroll Tax Rate Allowing for Labor Supply Response 
1995  12.46  12.35  12.24  12.14  12.03  11.93  11.83 
2002  11.72  11.62  11.51  1  1.40  11.27  11.14  11.00 
2009  10.86  10.70  10.52  10.31  10.09  9.86  9.60 
2016  9.32  9.01  8.69  8.34  7.98  7.59  7.21 
2023  6.80  6.38  5.95  5.54  5.14  4.73  4.3 1 
2030  3.89  5.86  6.07  5.80  5.53  5.25  4.98 
2037  4.72  4.47  4.22  3.96  3.71  3.47  3.22 
2044  2.98  2.74  2.5 1  2.28  2.07  1.87  1.67 
205 1  1.49  1.33  1.17  1.03  .90  .78  .67 
2058  .58  SO  .43  .36  .3  1  .26  .22 
2065  .I8  .I5  .I3  .I0  .08  .07  .05 
C. New Personal Income Tax Allowing for Labor Supply Response 
1995  20.09  20.09  20.08  20.08  20.08  20.08 
2002  20.08  20.07  20.07  20.07  20.07  20.06 
2009  20.05  20.04  20.03  20.02  20.00  19.98 
2016  19.93  19.90  19.86  19.83  19.79  19.73 
2023  19.62  19.56  19.50  19.44  19.39  19.33 
2030  19.22  19.46  19.49  19.45  19.42  19.38 
2037  19.31  19.27  19.24  19.21  19.17  19.14 
2044  19.08  19.05  19.02  18.99  18.96  18.93 
205 1  18.88  18.86  18.84  18.82  18.80  18.79 
2058  18.76  18.75  18.74  18.73  18.72  18.72 
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-  65.64 
-71.35 
-88.79 
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Table 6.12  (continued) 
D. Change in Deadweight Loss Owing to  Privatization ($billions) 
2051  -105.52  -107.00  -108.49  -109.92  -111.31  -112.59  -113.69 
2058  -114.63  -115.43  -116.16  -116.82  -117.40  -117.91  -118.37 
2065  -118.77  -119.12  -119.42  -119.68  -119.92  -120.13  -120.32 















-  .22 
-  .79 
-  1.46 
-  1.40 
-1.59 
-  1.70 
-  1.72 




-  .28 
-39 
-1.15 
-  1.43 
-  1.61 
-1.71 
-1.71 




-  .34 
-  .99 
-1.12 
-  1.46 
-  1.63 
-1.71 
-1.70 
-  1.62 
.I1 
.09 
-  .03 
-  .42 
-  1.09 
-1.19 
-  1.49 
-1.65 
-1.72 




-  .07 
-  .49 
-1.19 
-  1.26 
-  1.52 
-1.67 






-  .59 
-  1.28 
-1.33 
-  1.54 
-1.68 
-  1.72 
-  1.67 











-  1.56 
upanel  D of table 6.11. 
Table 6.13  Net Gains (% of payroll) from Phase-In Partial Privatization (by 
cohort) Partial Indexation and Solvency Adjustment 
Age in 1995 = 25 
1995  -  .02  .o  1  .04  .06  .08  -  .42  -  .42 
2002  -.43  -  .44  -  .44  -  .45  -  .44  -  .43  -  .40 
2009  -.37  -  .33  -.26  -.I4  -  .00  .I4  .32 
2016  .53  .77  1.04  1.33  1.66  2.12  2.57 
2023  3.05  3.54  4.05  4.54  5.02  5.49  5.97 
2030  6.44  4.12  3.83  4.11  4.39  .oo  .oo 
Age in 1995 = 40 
1995  -  .76  -  .76  -.76  -  .76  -  .77  -  .79  -.81 
2002  -23  -34  -36  -  .88  -  .89  -  .89  -37 
2009  -  .86  -33  -  .I7  -  .66  -.54  -.41  -  .26 
2016  -  .06  .I6  .4 1  .69  .oo  .oo  .oo 
Age in  1995 = 55 
1995  -1.34  -1.34  -1.35  -1.37  -1.39  -1.42  -1.44 
2002  -1.47  -1.50  -1.52  -  .oo  -  .oo  -  .oo  -  .00 
tax would have to rise (from 12.4 to 19.1 percent), but the level is dramati- 
cally lower. 
Table 6.15 presents our usual analysis of the transition path. The analysis 
assumes that benefits are maintained at the levels implied by current law after 
the trust fund is exhausted. Thus, instead of cutting the benefits at that time to 256  Martin Feldstein and Andrew Samwick 
Table 6.14  Actuarial Present Value of Net Gains from Phase-In Partial 
Privatization Partial Indexation and Solvency Adjustment 
~~ 
Thousands of Dollars per Worker  % of  Future Wages 












































-  1.96 
-2.30 
-2.26 
-  1.96 







-  .22 
-  .66 
-  .98 
-1.20 
-  1.41 
-  1.60 
4.62  3.89 
3.32  2.61 
2.21  1.60 
1.28  .81 
.67  .33 
.I5  -.I0 
-.31  -  .43 
-  .69  -.72 
-  .98  -  .91 
-1.19  -1.18 
-  1.40  -  1.40 
-1.60  -1.60 
the level that can be financed with the 12.4 percent payroll tax, the tax rate is 
raised to keep the trust fund at zero. In table 6.5, the payroll tax rate rises from 
5.00 percent in 2030 (when the trust fund was exhausted), to 6.02 percent in 
the next year, and 6.23 percent in 2032, before resuming its gradual decline. 
In contrast, in table 6.15, the payroll tax rate rises from 5.00 percent in 2030, 
to 7.57 percent in 2031, and 8.21 percent in 2032, before resuming a gradual 
decline. Panel E of table 6.15 shows that the maximum combined amount of 
payroll tax and MIRA contribution rises from 8.30 percent in 2030 to 11 50 
percent in 2032 and then declines. Thus, maintaining the original level of bene- 
fits after the trust fund is exhausted does not require a tax rate that is as high 
as the current 12.4 percent, which would not be capable of  financing the ex- 
isting benefit formula in a pay-as-you-go system. Note also that, in the earlier 
years, there is little difference in the combined payroll tax and MIRA contribu- 
tion. For example, in 2005, the combined payment is 13.87 percent versus the 
13.71 percent in the baseline case. That is not surprising since, in these early 
years, most employees need make little provision for the benefits to be received 
after 2030. 
6.10  Summary and Questions for Future Research 
The analysis in this paper has convinced us  that the transition to a fully 
privatized system of individual retirement accounts can be conducted in a way 
that conveys a very substantial long-run benefit and that has relatively modest 
transition costs. The longer-term benefits would exceed 5 percent of GDP ev- 
ery year. Younger employees at the time of the transition would be net gainers 
in their own working lives. The net extra costs incurred by  older employees 
during the transition would be very  small and would generally be more than Table 6.15  Phase-In from Partial to Total Privatization with Current 
Law Benefits 



























































































































.81  .9 1  1  .oo  1.11  1.21 
I .54  1.65  1.77  1.89  2.01 
2.39  2.5 I  2.62  2.74  2.86 
3.20  3.31  3.41  3.51  3.49 
3.45  3.43  3.40  3.38  3.35 
3.29  3.29  3.28  3.28  3.26 
3.25  3.25  3.25  3.25  3.26 
3.25  3.24  3.24  3.23  3.23 
3.22  3.21  3.20  3.19  3.17 
3.14  3.14  3.13  3.13  3.13 
3.13  3.13  3.14  3.14  3.15 
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12.40  12.40  12.39  12.37  12.36  12.33  12.30 
12.26  12.22  12.16  12.10  12.02  11.93  11.82 
11.70  11.58  11.43  1 1.24  11.03  10.82  10.59 
10.32  10.04  9.73  9.41  9.06  8.69  8.32 
7.92  7.52  7.09  6.68  6.27  5.85  5.43 
5.00  7.57  8.21  7.87  7.53  7.18  6.79 
6.43  6.08  5.74  5.38  5.05  4.7 I  4.39 258  Martin Feldstein and Andrew Samwick 
Table 6.15  (continued) 
D. Payroll Tax Needed to Maintain Trust Fund Trajectory (% of  Payroll) 
2044  4.07  3.75  3.45  3.16  2.88  2.6 1  2.36 
205 1  2.12  1.91  1.70  1.51  1.33  1.16  I .02 
2058  .89  .77  .67  .57  .49  .42  .36 
2065  .30  .25  .2  1  .I7  .I4  .I2  .I0 












13.12  13.21  13.29 
13.69  13.75  13.81 
13.96  13.96  13.94 
13.40  13.23  13.04 
11.39  10.97  10.52 
8.30  10.86  11.50 
9.68  9.33  8.99 
7.32  7.00  6.69 
5.34  5.12  4.91 
4.04  3.92  3.81 












13.46  13.54  13.61 
13.91  13.94  13.95 
13.77  13.68  13.56 
12.57  12.18  11.81 
9.64  9.20  8.76 
10.80  10.44  10.04 
8.30  7.97  7.64 
6.11  5.84  5.58 
4.52  4.34  4.18 
3.62  3.55  3.48 
3.29  3.26  3.25 
offset by  the positive net benefits that their own children would receive. For 
the first fifty years of the transition taken as a whole, the present value of net 
gains would be positive for any reasonable rate of interest. 
Our research has suggested a variety of issues that deserve further attention. 
One important issue is the ability to protect individuals from the risk of market 
volatility. Another significant issue is the treatment of  couples, including the 
special problems caused by divorce and remarriage. In principle, this should 
be easier to deal with  in a system of individual accounts, but this deserves 
detailed analysis. 
The role of survivor benefits and disability benefits should also be consid- 
ered more explicitly. How can these be provided  in a way  that captures the 
potential real return on the market mix of equity and debt? How would permit- 
ting bequests affect the economics of  the program? 
Although our calculations indicate that a small tax-based redistribution of 
MIRA assets at age sixty-five can prevent poverty in old age, it would be good 
to examine this and other distributional issues in more detail. 
The potential long-run gain from privatizing social security implies that fur- 
ther research on these issues deserves a very high priority. 
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Comment  John B. Shoven 
This is a “must read” paper for anyone interested in privatizing social security. 
The reason is that it addresses the most difficult aspect of social security re- 
form-the  transition. It is a fundamentally honest paper in that it shows that, 
even though a mature MIRA (mandatory individual retirement account) sys- 
tem could be funded with approximately a 2 percent contribution rate, there 
would be a transitionary period where the total contributions for social security 
retirement would have to be increased from the existing 12.4 percent of cov- 
ered payroll. The startling aspect of the paper, however, is how small and tem- 
porary the necessary contribution increase is. The authors phase in the MIRA 
plan in  such a way  that total payroll deductions for social security and the 
MIRA accounts peak at 13.74  percent in 2007. The total deductions and contri- 
butions fall below  12.4 percent by  2019 and eventually decline to about 2.1 
percent. Often it is stated that  stopping a pay-as-you-go retirement  system 
would of necessity cause one generation to pay for two retirements. Feldstein 
and Samwick show that there is some merit to that logic but that the losses to 
those working during the transition can be kept quite modest. The long-run 
gains are extremely impressive in this analysis, approximating 12 percent of 
covered payroll, or 5 percent of GDP. 
There are a number of  features of  the Feldstein-Samwick study that  are 
worth noting. First, they credit the additional saving in the MIRA accounts 
with the full pretax return (estimated at a real 9 percent) on the incremental 
capital. As the authors argue, some accounting of  the tax proceeds generated 
by the additional capital is necessary for a complete economic analysis of the 
plan. They credit the tax proceeds (primarily the corporate income tax) back 
to the MIRA accounts. As political economy, this is more questionable. Again, 
John B. Shoven is the Charles R. Schwab Professor of Economics and dean of  the School of 
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the authors realize this and provide some analysis crediting the accounts with 
only the 5.4 percent net of corporate tax rate of return. With the 5.4 percent 
return, the long-run MIRA contribution rate rises to roughly 3.3 percent. The 
authors also do not deduct a management fee for those handling the MIRA 
accounts. There is room for disagreement about the necessary  magnitude of 
such fees, but a deduction of between 0.2 and 1  .O percent a year would seem 
reasonable. To offset such a reduction in net rates of return, the required contri- 
bution rate would have to be slightly increased. 
A second feature of the Feldstein-Samwick paper that represents good eco- 
nomic  analysis is that they have recognized that the existing social security 
system is unsustainable. Before you can compare the outcomes with the MIRA 
system with the existing structure, you have to make assumptions about how 
the existing system will be changed to regain financial  sustainability. Their 
base-case adjustment to the present system is to assume that it will switch to a 
pure pay-as-you-go basis once the trust fund is exhausted and that benefits will 
be reduced to live within the proceeds of the  12.4 percent  payroll tax. The 
benefit reductions begin  in 2031 and are approximately  24 percent initially, 
rising to 35 percent by 2070. These reductions could be partially achieved by 
raising the retirement age more than currently scheduled. As a matter of politi- 
cal economy, once again, the adjustments to restore long-run solvency to the 
existing system might well involve tax increases as well as benefit reductions. 
While this would slightly raise the required MIRA contribution rate, it would 
presumably only increase the efficiency gain of  the privatized  plan over the 
pay-as-you-go social security system. 
The authors discuss the issue of risk. One of their initial points is that even 
the current social security  system with its set of defined benefit promises is 
risky. Certainly, the system as it stands today cannot be sustained, and its parti- 
cipants bear the risk of how it will be changed. Still, once fully implemented, 
the MIRA system would be risky in that the rate of return in financial markets 
is highly variable,  more so than reflected  in the accounting returns and the 
tax proceeds on corporate capital. One potential stabilizing force offered by 
Feldstein and Samwick is the rebate of  the corporate tax attributable to the 
MIRA capital. Perhaps the best measure of the riskiness of financial invest- 
ments is captured by Tobin’s  Q, the ratio of the paper value of the nation’s 
capital stock (i.e., the value of the stocks and bonds) to the accounting or book 
value of the replacement cost of the capital. The graph of Tobin’s Q,  as taken 
from Poterba and Samwick (1993, is shown in figure 6C. 1. 
The decline between  1968 and 1974 is truly staggering, with Q falling by 
more than 70 percent. The climb from 1984 to 1995 is equally dramatic, with 
Q more than tripling. This gives some idea of the variability  in the value of 
the MIRA accounts through time owing to market fluctuations. Feldstein and 
Samwick address this by suggesting that the MIRA contribution rate could be 
increased by about one-third over what would be necessary on the basis of the 
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Fig. 6C.1  Tobin's Q:  The ratio of the market value of equity dividend by the 
replacement cost of net assets 
of  faring worse than with the existing social security system to less than 5 
percent even if an individual lived to the age of one hundred. Another possibil- 
ity mentioned by the authors would be to leave the means-tested supplementary 
security income program in place to protect those who fare particularly poorly. 
My own guess is that there will be a large debate between those who favor 
a plan such as that described by  Feldstein and Samwick and those who favor a 
"double-decker" plan that retains a certain level of defined-benefit promises. 
One such plan is described by  the 1994-96 Social Security Advisory Commis- 
sion as personal security accounts and involves flat benefits of $410 per month 
for singles, $600 per month for married elderly couples, plus the proceeds of 
a 5 percent individual account. The first tier of defined-benefit money provides 
a floor of support and somewhat stabilizes retirement income, particularly for 
lower-income individuals. The difference between the first-tier benefits for sin- 
gles and marrieds retains the transfer to couples in the current law, again partic- 
ularly for low-income individuals. The benefits of the two-tier approach come 
at a cost, of  course. The flat benefits must be tax financed, and thus the two- 
tier program would offer much smaller efficiency benefits for the economy 
than the MIRA plan described by  Feldstein and Samwick. 
My  conclusion is that Feldstein and Samwick have  provided the analysis 
that makes considering the privatization of social security in the United States 
feasible. They are not advocating the particular features of the plan that they 
present; rather, they are simply showing that the transition costs can be man- 
ageable and that the potential for efficiency gains for the economy is enor- 
mous. They have  raised a number of  issues that need to be studied further, 263  The Transition Path in Privatizing Social Security 
including accounting for the total return of incremental saving and dealing with 
the riskiness of both pay-as-you-go plans and privatized plans. To end where I 
began, this paper is a “must read.” 
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Discussion Summary  Jeffrey Liebman and Andrew Samwick 
The discussion  began  by  focusing  on  whether  the  gains  achieved  by  the 
Feldstein-Samwick plan were unique to social security privatization. One par- 
ticipant argued that any other method of reducing the national debt would do 
the same thing by taking advantage of the tax wedge in the rates of  return to 
capital. He noted that, in a simple lifetime utility model, we do not want to tax 
the rate of return. Another participant said that it was not necessary for the plan 
to include a payroll tax increase and that reduced government spending could 
achieve the  same ends. A third participant  said that the Feldstein-Samwick 
proposal was not really about social security reform but was instead really just 
a way  to raise taxes that will reduce the national debt and therefore increase 
the capital stock. In response, a member of the Social Security Advisory Coun- 
cil said that the paper did an important service by making it explicit that either 
benefits need to be cut or taxes raised in the transition  to a new system. He 
said that cutting benefits is as much a cost as raising taxes. 
Discussion turned to the authors’ assumptions about the rate of return that 
could be earned under their plan. One participant said that the key to the paper 
is the difference between the rate of return  paid  on equities and the rate of 
return paid by social security. He said that, if there were no other distortions 
and full access to capital markets, the higher rate of return on stocks results 
because there is more risk with stocks. Since some people will get hurt by this 
risk, it is a mistake to use the high average rates of return without adjusting 
for risk. One member of the Social Security Advisory Council questioned the 
authors’ assumptions about rates of return on the accounts. The council mem- 
ber  explained  that the  council’s  plan  assumed that  people  hold 50 percent 
bonds and 50 percent equities and that there is a 4 percent spread between the 
returns on bonds and the returns on equities. Then 1 percent was subtracted for 
administrative  costs. This produced  a rate of  return  of  3.65, which is quite 
different from the 9 percent rate used by Feldstein and Samwick. Another par- 
ticipant concurred that the 9 percent rate of return was too high and asked how 264  Martin Feldstein and Andrew Samwick 
all the additional saving would affect the economy and interest rates. He also 
argued that the Latin American experience demonstrates that the administra- 
tive costs of a privatized system are at least 1 percent. 
In response, Feldstein defended the rate-of-return assumptions in the paper. 
He said that the paper assumes that people hold 60 percent equities and 40 
percent debt. This is the same blend as in the economy as a whole. If equities 
currently receive a 7 percent return and debt around 3 percent, the average is 
5.4 percent. However, it is necessary to add back the corporate tax payments. 
Thus, 5.4 + 3.6 = 9 percent. In fact, the historical  average is 9.3 percent. 
Even accounting for administrative costs, this number is likely to be at least 
8.5 percent. 
The discussion turned to general equilibrium effects. One member of  the 
group suggested that investors would reduce their holding of equities in other 
accounts since their MIRA accounts would be riskier than their current social 
security wealth. It was also pointed out that the paper assumed that MIRA 
contributions are net new savings because the dollars are assumed to come out 
of consumption. But, if  there are other offsetting changes in savings, this is 
incorrect, and the paper overstates the benefits of this plan. 
Feldstein responded  that it is unlikely  that many people would decrease 
other savings by much since most people are saving so little currently. More- 
over, average retirement benefits would not increase in this plan, so it is hard 
to see why other retirement savings would decline. 